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Introduction
The Fourth Crusade, which lasted from 1202 to 1204, was an attempt by the Papacy to
rally an organized effort under their control to “liberate” the Holy Land and retake Jerusalem,
which Ayyubid Sultanate had conquered in 1187. The crusade was an abject failure in this
regard. The crusaders planned to sail to the Holy Land instead of marching over land, learning
from the mistakes of past crusades. Marching through the Balkans had resulted in protracted
negotiations and conflicts with the Byzantine Empire and marching through Anatolia left them
vulnerable to Turkish attacks.1 The crusade leaders, namely Marquis Boniface of Montferrat,
Count Baldwin of Flanders, Count Hugh of St. Pol, and Count Louis of Blois, estimated that they
would raise an army of 33,500 troops, and contracted with Venice for the construction of a
transport fleet, agreeing to pay 85,000 marks and half of all loot acquired during the expedition.2
Their estimations were horribly inaccurate: only roughly 11,000 soldiers assembled at Venice,
and the crusaders became 34,000 marks in debt to Venice. To make the unruly crusader army
leave Venice, the Doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo (r.1192-1205), proposed that the crusader
army sail to the city of Zara3 and put down the rebellious city and restore Venetian authority in
the region.4 After sacking the city in 1202 and receiving condemnatory letters from Pope
Innocent III (r.1198-1216), a Byzantine pretender, Alexios IV, approached the crusader army
with a proposition: in exchange for installing him on the Byzantine throne, he would convert
both himself and the Empire to Catholicism, pay the crusaders 200,000 marks, and raise an army
of ten thousand men to join the crusade.5 It is worth noting that the diversion to Constantinople
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was highly contentious within the crusader army. Two thousand men deserted the expedition,
and the army almost mutinied during a stop at the island of Corfu.6
Promising that the diversion would be brief, the crusade leaders managed to restore order
and sail on, arriving before the sea walls of Constantinople. Despite Alexios IV’s promises, there
was no coup or revolt within the city, and the crusaders were forced to assault the monumental
fortifications of the city.7 Against all odds, the crusaders managed to fight long enough to force
the reigning Byzantine emperor to flee, and Alexios IV and his father, Isaac II, were installed by
the crusaders and the city’s populace as co-emperors.8 Despite the promises of the crusade
leadership, the diversion was not a quick affair, and Alexios IV required assistance in extending
his power beyond the walls of Constantinople, as the previous emperor, Alexios III, had fled to
the provinces. The crusader army remained outside the walls of the city, with some aiding
Alexios IV in his campaigns, but tensions mounted as he could not keep his promises to the
crusaders, especially his promise to pay 200,000 marks to them. When riots broke out and
clashes began between the crusaders and the notoriously unruly population of Constantinople,
the crusaders set a fire that spread throughout the city, destroying huge sections, and creating a
massive refugee crisis within the city.9
It became entirely politically untenable for Alexios IV to maintain his alliance with the
crusaders, and when they brazenly demanded more money, he refused, and the crusaders
declared war. A court bureaucrat, Alexios V, overthrew and murdered Alexios IV in a palace
coup, further angering the crusaders, whose indebted claimant was just deposed. Once again,
6
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against all odds, the Venetians managed to scale the sea walls and the crusaders managed to
breach the land walls. Alexios V fled the city, and Constantinople surrendered to the crusader
army. For the first time in the city’s history, a brutal sack began, resulting in unprecedented
widespread looting and destruction. The crusaders established the Latin Empire upon the city’s
ashes, and temporarily destroyed the Byzantine Empire. Most of the provinces broke away under
the leadership of local magnates, independent of Latin control.10
Pope Innocent III officially proclaimed the Fourth Crusade on August 15th, 1198; six
years later, on April 12th, 1204, the Byzantine Christian city of Constantinople fell to the
crusaders.11 Despite the fact that the crusade’s goal was to reclaim Jerusalem, the expedition
never even reached the Middle East. It was meant to the be first crusade with direct papal
control, yet Pope Innocent III could not even prevent the crusading army from sacking the
Croatian city of Zara or diverting entirely to Constantinople. Why the crusade never reached
Egypt, its intended target, or even fought any Muslims, and why the Byzantine Empire became
the victim of this crusade has been a matter of historiographical debate for centuries. Even in the
years immediately after the Fourth Crusade, sources have laid the blame for the crusade’s
diversion at the Venetians,12 the pope,13 or attempted to justify the diversion by accusing the
Byzantines of heresy and degeneracy. The debate regarding the Fourth Crusade began mere
years after the event and continues among historians to this day. Historians debate almost every
single important event during the crusade, namely the building of the crusader fleet, the Sack of
Zara, the arrival in Constantinople, and its fall and sack.
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However, modern historians have too often ignored the topic of stereotypes and the role
which they played in Byzantine-crusader interactions during the first four crusades, and this has
not received enough serious scholarly attention. Too frequently, scholars have simply thrown up
their hands and stated that the whole event was an unfortunate accident instead of examining the
wider context of deep-rooted hateful sentiments between Byzantines and Western Europeans, as
most historians view these sentiments as outdated pieces of evidence for long disregarded
theories.
This work will argue that anti-Byzantine and anti-Latin sentiments permeated crusade-era
primary sources, particularly narrative histories, and that these stereotypes directly interfered
with political decision-making, resulting in disastrous misinterpretations and errors during
Byzantine-crusader interactions. Chapter one contains a history of the historiography of the
Fourth Crusade and the prominent theories explaining its diversion to Constantinople. Chapter
two presents direct evidence from the primary narrative sources of the first four numbered
crusades, organized by author. Chapter three contains a comparative analysis of the evidence
presented in chapter two, and an argument for this evidence’s inclusion into an expanded version
of Jonathan Harris’ theory. An original translation of an obscure Fourth Crusade primary source,
the Devastatio Constantinopolitana, is included in the appendix.

Chapter One: Fourth Crusade Historiography
The historiography of the Fourth Crusade, as pointed out by Thomas Madden, is an
endless series of debates regarding the motives and actions of the primary actors.14 Over the past
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century, historians have proposed and rejected preposterous conspiracy theories,15 engaged in
victim blaming,16 placed all blame upon the Venetians,17 and exonerated the Venetians.18
Therefore, there is extraordinarily little consensus regarding the motives, events, and results of
the Fourth Crusade. The debate on the Fourth Crusade has been ongoing for centuries and will
continue to do so. Jonathan Harris stated that “The diversion of the Fourth Crusade provides a
fascinating case study of this question as it can be seen as the result either of cunning planning
and manipulation or of forces over which the participants had no control. As long as human
beings maintain an interest in their own ability to shape their historical destiny, therefore, the
debate will continue.”19 Though some historians argue that the debate is meaningless and
endless,20 there is great insight to be gained by examining the Fourth Crusade and the reasons for
its diversion, especially now ignored aspects such as stereotypes.
This chapter will examine the evolution of historiographical attitudes concerning the
Fourth Crusade, the transformation from the dominance of grand narrative theories to synthesis
and nuance, and the arguments of the prominent Medieval and Byzantine historians Donald
Queller, Michael Angold, and Jonathan Harris, each of whom wrote important monographs on
the Fourth Crusade and put forth new theories and ideas regarding the origins of the crusade.
This chapter will argue that Harris’ theory is the most convincing and well-argued but does not
go far enough in examining the role of stereotypes and hostile language in primary sources.

15
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Grand Narratives
The historiography of the Fourth Crusade began almost immediately after the actual
event, as crusade participants sought to write narrative accounts absolving themselves of
dereliction of their crusading duty to protect the Holy Land and defend their actions in
Constantinople. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, one of the leaders of the crusade, wrote an account
arguing that the diversion occurred due to deserters weakening the crusade army, while Robert
de Clari claimed in his account that the diversion to Constantinople was a convenient method for
the rich leaders of the crusade to acquire more riches, even directly stating that the attack against
the Byzantines was entirely motivated by greed.
Nineteenth century scholars mostly blamed individuals, such as the crusade leader
Marquis Boniface of Montferrat, or Doge Enrico Dandolo and his city of Venice, for the
disastrous end of the Fourth Crusade. These were very simplistic theories which accepted the
narratives argued by authors of the primary sources themselves without criticism. Although some
historians continued to parrot these narratives into the twentieth century, these very shallow
explanations largely died out during that century.
The twentieth century saw the rise of two major theories: the “clash of civilizations” and
“accidental” theories. The clash of civilizations theory argues that the Fourth Crusade was a
massive clash of two fundamentally different civilizations, East and West, and that the Eastern
and Western civilizations themselves were not compatible and were building up to conflict for
centuries.21 The pitfalls of such a theory are obvious. No major western European powers, such
as France or Germany, participated directly in the Fourth Crusade, and even Pope Innocent III
condemned the actions of the crusaders during the expedition, excommunicating contingents of
21
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the army. This theory also assumed that the Western and Eastern civilizations were monolithic,
acting with one will and one set of beliefs. Though this theory has rightfully come under intense
scrutiny in the past decades, some historians still argue variations of it in more focused and
nuanced forms synthesized with the other primary theory, the accidental theory.22
The “accidental” theory, pushed even by crusade leaders such as Geoffrey of
Villehardouin in the years immediately following the crusade, argues that the diversion of the
crusade was a mere series of accidents, and that no one is truly to blame.23 Historians in the
nineteenth century widely accepted this theory, dismantling previous notions of grand
civilizational clashes and attributing the attack against the Byzantines to a series of
miscalculations and mistakes, such as the underestimation of the number of crusaders who would
arrive at Venice. This theory has taken much more criticism over the years from modern
scholars. This idea almost entirely denies agency and intent and argues that the participants in the
crusade and its leaders were merely acted upon by uncontrollable forces, as if it was destined to
happen. Further, it removes responsibility from the crusaders and their leaders for their horrific
actions against the Byzantines, and likewise downplays the errors the Byzantines made in prior
crusades when interacting with the western expeditionary forces. Again, like the clash of
civilizations theory, this hypothesis only survives in modern scholarship in much more nuanced
variations.
In the past forty years, historians Donald Queller, Michael Angold, and Jonathan Harris
authored the most prominent historical works regarding the Fourth Crusade. Although differing
in detail, these authors presented new theories, utilizing more obscure sources, such as surviving
letters and lesser-known narrative accounts, and combining the accidental and clash of
22
23
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civilizations theories into a new, modern, and nuanced synthesis, piecing together ideas and
elements from both theories while adding new contributions.
Synthesis
To some extent, each of the modern authors, Queller, Angold, and Harris, present
syntheses of the clash of civilizations and accidental theories. Queller’s argument is a much more
revised and nuanced version of the accidental theory, while combining elements from the clash
theory, while Angold and Harris’ arguments are primarily derived from the clash of civilizations
theory. However, all these authors differ in their arguments regarding the origins of the diversion
to Constantinople.
Donald Queller is famous for his popular revisionist history The Fourth Crusade: The
Conquest of Constantinople. In this text, the author argued that modern historians have defamed
Venice and its doge, Enrico Dandolo, utilizing the controversial figure as a convenient scapegoat
while ignoring the other important factors in the diversion of the crusade. Queller sought to
exculpate Venice from its traditionally held role as the evil plotting power which caused the
demise of the Byzantine Empire, instead arguing that Venice’s actions on the crusade were
logical and self-interested. He made particular use of non-narrative primary sources, such as
papal letters and correspondence between the crusade leaders to reinforce his argument.
Queller argues, contrary to most of his contemporary historians, that men like Boniface
of Montferrat and Geoffrey of Villehardouin consistently supported the crusade’s diversion to
the Byzantine Empire, often against the soldiers’ wishes. He claims that the crusade leadership’s
overprediction of turnout for the crusade, 33,500 men, instead of the actual 11,000 that appeared
in Venice, was the crucial factor in determining the diversion to Constantinople, as the debt to

11

Venice and weakness of the army meant they would never make it to Egypt.24 He also stresses
the massive financial effort put in by the Venetians towards the crusade, providing this as
evidence for the lack of a premeditated plot and their genuine desire to lead the crusade to
Egypt.25
Queller further claims that the diversion of the crusade was not a case of entrapment by
the Venetians, but a logical and reasonable demand from the doge to recover their lost money.
He points out that there is no direct evidence to prove that there was an entrapment plot by the
Venetians, and that the power of merchant families and financial prosperity were foundational
pillars of the republic’s existence.26 If Dandolo did not act in Venice’s financial interests, the
prominent Venetian families would replace him with someone who would. Queller notes how
Pope Innocent III expressly forbade the diversion of the crusade to help Alexios IV,27 but his
promises to help the crusaders were too tempting, as they would resolve the financial difficulties
in which Venice and the crusade army were embroiled in. Queller importantly notes that Pope
Innocent III expressly forbade attacking the Byzantine Empire in a letter; rather than tell their
troops the truth, the crusade leadership deliberately lied to the army and claimed that the
diversion had papal support.28
Therefore, Queller synthesized the accidental and civilizational clash theories into a new
hybrid theory. He wrote that the attack against the Byzantines was not a premeditated plot
conjured by Doge Enrico Dandolo, but rather the result of the greed and chivalric ideals of the
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other crusade leaders. His primary goal was to dispel the theory that Venice plotted the
destruction of the Byzantine Empire and shift blame onto leaders such as Boniface of Montferrat.
In his work The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context, Michael Angold argues a synthesis
of both the accidental and clash of civilizations theories, claiming that the Fourth Crusade was
the result of a series of deliberate decisions and events based upon growing animosity between
crusaders and Byzantines, but without any major conspiracy or overarching plan.29 His focus on
the background of events, particularly the previous history of interactions between the crusaders
and the Byzantines during prior crusades, demonstrates that his work was greatly derived from
the clash of civilizations theory.
He argues that the crusade leaders genuinely erred in their misestimation of the number
of troops who would appear at Venice,30 and that they initially attacked the Byzantines due to
chivalric notions of restoring a rightful claimant which were too glorious to resist and because
the reduced number of crusaders made the original target of Egypt no longer realistic. Angold
also claims that Philip of Swabia, the King of Germany, orchestrated Alexios IV’s meeting with
the crusade leaders in Zara, and that Boniface of Montferrat “allowed himself to be used by the
German king…”31 implying that the diversion to Constantinople was a German plot, claiming
that there was a degree of premeditation.
Angold claims that the crusade leadership possessed a broader definition of crusading
than the soldiers under their command, believing that crusading could not only defend the Holy
Land, but also spread the faith and combat heresy.32 Taking inspiration from Queller, Angold
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reduces the role of the Venetians in his Fourth Crusade narrative, stating that they did not likely
back the diversion to the Byzantine Empire as zealously as the other crusade leaders, but
nonetheless acted in their commercial interests.
Utilizing letters from former crusade leaders after the crusade, Angold attributes the sack
of Constantinople itself to the perception of the crusaders that the Byzantines had betrayed them
by not paying the sums that Alexios IV promised. Therefore, he writes that the sack of
Constantinople was a deliberate act, not an accident, but that misjudgments and accidental errors,
such as the overestimation of troops in Venice, greatly influenced the course of events and
placed the crusaders into a position where sacking Constantinople was viable and profitable.
Jonathan Harris argues in his work Byzantium and the Crusades that the preceding
decades and centuries of Byzantine-crusader interactions, especially during the First, Second,
and Third Crusades, played a crucial role in the decision making of both the crusaders and the
Byzantines. He argues that placing the Fourth Crusade within this context is necessary to
understand the motives of both sides and examines crusader-Byzantine interactions during the
first four crusades. He further claims that the Byzantine diplomatic bureaucracy misjudged the
intentions and capabilities of the crusaders, and that this was the cause of the Fourth Crusade’s
diversion and the attack on Constantinople.
Harris convincingly argues that the Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople were
the result of cumulative Byzantine foreign policy failures and misunderstandings since the First
Crusade.33 The Byzantine Empire’s policy of putting its own territory and interests above those
of the crusade and using any means necessary to keep the country safe meant that the Crusaders

33
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and western Europeans developed a sense of animosity towards the Byzantines, who decried
them as treacherous, weak, and immoral. Harris relies on examples such as this and Manuel I
Komnenos’ attacks on the crusading armies during the Second Crusade to argue that almost all
trust between the west and the Byzantine Empire had evaporated, and that the Byzantine
bureaucracy had severely misjudged the crusaders’ intentions and strength.34 Harris also cites
German Emperor Henry VI’s threatened invasion of the Byzantine Empire in 1195 as an
example of the building tensions between western nations and the Byzantine Empire, as Henry
VI threatened to invade unless the Byzantines paid him five thousand pounds of gold, opened
their ports, and joined their fleet with his in a new crusade.35 Though this threatened invasion
never occurred, the threat itself demonstrated the increasing hostility towards the Byzantine
Empire among western nations.
Regarding the diversion to Constantinople, Harris argues that, for over a century prior,
crusaders were constantly trying to get the Byzantines to provide more assistance to the crusades
in the form of both troops and logistical support, and Alexios IV’s offer proved to be the best
opportunity yet for the crusaders to acquire the resources of the Byzantine Empire and use them
to their advantage on crusade.36 The crusaders firmly believed that prior Byzantine Emperors had
betrayed and undermined the crusades, scamming them at trading markets and refusing to
provide sufficient military or logistical support. They believed that the Byzantine emperors were
anti-Latin and installing their own pro-Latin candidate would end this hostility.
Commenting upon the capture and sack of Constantinople, Harris claims that the
Byzantine government failed to anticipate the strength and capability of the crusader army. He
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emphasizes that the dedicated diplomatic corps of the Empire failed in their assessment of the
crusades throughout all four crusades, but especially in the Third and Fourth Crusades. The corps
informed the Byzantine emperors that the crusaders were mere barbarians who stood no chance
against the Byzantine army, and that the government could emulate the actions of previous
emperors against the crusaders, not considering the huge power imbalance that had developed in
prior decades.37
Therefore, although these historians argue variations of a synthesis of the two primary
theories, stereotypes and hostile language present within crusade-era primary sources play an
exceedingly small role in modern historiography of the Fourth Crusade. The only scholars to
emphasize the role of anti-Byzantine and anti-Latin stereotypes in decision making during the
Fourth Crusade are Michael Angold and Jonathan Harris. Angold, arguing his hybrid theory,
does not deny that tensions mounted between the crusaders and Byzantines during the previous
three crusades. However, these tensions and stereotypes do not form an integral part of his
argument, and he allocates very little space in the book on the subject.
Jonathan Harris argues that historians must place the Fourth Crusade in its proper
context, viewed together with the previous three crusades. Mounting tensions and repeated
hostile interactions play a key role in Harris’ argument that the Byzantine bureaucracy severely
misjudged the intentions and power of the crusaders. Harris does not believe in the clash of
civilizations theory due to the intertwined nature of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and the
fact that there were pro and anti-Latin factions within the Byzantine Empire. Further, he argues
that the original plan of the Fourth Crusade was not to attack Constantinople, and that the lack of
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Catholic support for the Latin Empire after the sack demonstrated that western Europeans did not
condone the actions of the crusaders.38 Instead, Harris synthesized both the clash of civilizations
and accidental theories, and proposed that the Fourth Crusade and conflicts with the crusaders
occurred due to Byzantine ideology, particularly regarding the idea that Anatolia and all lands
taken in the previous crusades, including Antioch and Jerusalem, were rightfully Byzantine.
Harris also emphasizes the crusader views that the Byzantines were not contributing enough to
the crusades, and that the crusaders needed to compel the Byzantines by force to remedy this. He
notes that the crusaders resented treatment of being shadowed by Byzantine armies and being
locked out of Constantinople during the first three crusades, and that they saw Byzantine
diplomacy with Muslim states as betraying the Christian cause.39
Harris, however, does not particularly emphasize the role of stereotypes and hostile
language against Latins in Byzantine sources, instead focusing on the Byzantine imperial
ideology and worldview. Nevertheless, stereotypes regarding “barbarians” comprised an integral
aspect of the Byzantine worldview, as evidenced by the multitude of evidence within the primary
sources of the era. The Byzantines believed that the crusaders, and all western Europeans, were
just as much “barbarians” as the Muslims were and refer to them as such in their texts. Byzantine
authors held great disdain for the defective character traits of the Latins and understood them to
have taken their actions due to these traits.
Overall, the Fourth Crusade is one of the most highly debated events in history.
Historians have blamed nearly every participant and leader, from Pope Innocent III, Marquis
Boniface of Montferrat, and Doge Enrico Dandolo. Conspiracy theories claim that the Doge and
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the Venetians preplanned the whole event, as Alfonso Lowe demonstrated.40 Some authors such
as Runciman41argue that the crusade was a series of events with a tragic outcome, claiming that
the Sack of Constantinople was “…one of the greatest crimes against humanity…”42 Other
authors, such as Angold, downplay the severity of the sack, claiming that it was mostly
Byzantine propaganda. There is no universally accepted consensus, especially in modern times,
about the cause for the diversion of the crusade. Some historians have claimed it was inevitable,
others that it was the result of premeditation, others that it was an accident. However, authors
such as Harris, Queller, Madden, and Angold, all provided unique perspectives and insight on the
Fourth Crusade, largely combining elements of the two primary theories into newer, more
nuanced forms. Despite the wide differences of opinion, each historian offers unique insight into
one of the most divisive and decisive events in history.
Out of all these theses, Harris’ argument is by far the most convincing explanation for the
degradation of Byzantine-crusader relations during the first four crusades. Taking a wholistic
view, Harris correctly places the Fourth Crusade into the context of Byzantine-crusader
interactions, surveying relations not just in the Fourth Crusade, but the first three as well. He
understood that both the Byzantines and the western Europeans possessed several narrative
histories of previous crusades and attempted to analyze and learn from the mistakes of their
ancestors, or to emulate their perceived successes. He also convincingly argued that the
government of the Byzantine Empire misunderstood the intentions and strength of the crusade
armies, seeking to exploit, deflect, or otherwise manipulate them in accordance with the highly
defensive Byzantine imperial ideology.
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One area, however, that could reinforce Harris’ theory greatly is the direct analysis of
primary sources. In his work, Harris did not specifically comprehensively survey and compare
the narrative accounts from the first four numbered crusades and did not investigate the role of
hostile language and stereotypes contained within, instead choosing to provide an excellent
analysis on high-level diplomatic interactions and strategic decision making. This work will
present an in-depth analysis of western and Byzantine narrative sources from the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Crusades, and will demonstrate that hostile stereotypes contributed to poor
decision-making and misinterpretation of each other’s actions by both Byzantine and crusade
leaders. This argument will serve to strengthen and extend Harris’ theory of misinterpretation
and misjudgment.

Chapter Two: Analysis of Primary Sources from the First Four Crusades
First Crusade Sources
The First Crusade (1096-1099) was the first and by far the most successful of the
crusades. Called for by Pope Urban II (r.1088-1099) in 1095 at the Council of Clermont, the
crusade resulted in the capture of important Levantine cities such as Antioch and Jerusalem, and
the establishment of the crusader states, namely the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Principality of
Antioch, and the Counties of Tripoli and Edessa. On their march East, the crusaders also
defeated the forces of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum at Nicaea and Dorylaeum, allowing the
Byzantine Empire to begin the reconquest of Anatolia.
Initially, the goal of the crusade was twofold: to aid Byzantine Emperor Alexios
Komnenos’ (r.1081-1118) fight against the Turks, who had conquered nearly the entirety of
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Anatolia in the preceding decades, which had formerly been the Byzantine heartland, and to take
the Holy Land, securing the region for Christian pilgrimage. Though they ostensibly strove
towards the same goals, the interactions between the Byzantines and the crusaders were often
tense, sometimes breaking out into hostilities. Various crusading contingents making their way to
Constantinople raided Byzantine territory in the Balkans seeking supplies and loot.43 Rumors
that Alexios had imprisoned certain crusade leaders threatened to break out into open warfare.
Bohemond d’Hauteville, the Norman lord of Sicily (r.1089-1111), certainly did not lessen
tensions when he joined the crusade. The Normans had fought the Byzantine Empire for control
of Sicily and Southern Italy for decades, and Bohemond and his father Robert Guiscard (r.10571085) had both launched an invasion of the Byzantine Empire itself.44 Though he and the other
crusade leaders, namely Raymond of Toulouse, Hugh of Vermandois, Godfrey de Bouillon,
Stephen of Blois, Tancred d’Hauteville, and Robert of Flanders, all reluctantly swore oaths to
return any land taken to the Byzantine Empire, the Byzantine suspicion regarding their true
motives was not fully allayed.45
Indeed, this oath swearing satisfied neither side, for the Byzantines did not trust the
westerners and the crusaders felt that they were compelled to swear the oath by force, as they
could not proceed past Constantinople without Byzantine permission and aid. Therefore, when
the crusaders had established their new principalities in the Levant, only Raymond of Toulouse,
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ruling over the County of Tripoli, pledged allegiance to the Empire. Bohemond d’Hauteville,
Prince of Antioch, and his successor Tancred, both fiercely fought Byzantine attempts to pry
Antioch from their grasp. The Kingdom of Jerusalem retained far more peaceful relations with
the Empire, but the Byzantines never forgot that these princes ruled former Byzantine territory.
The First Crusade is notable in its wealth of contemporary narrative sources, namely the
narrative accounts of the crusade from the western perspective. The chief works are the
anonymous Gesta Francorum,46 the Historia Hierosolymitana of Robert the Monk,47 the Gesta
Tancredi of Ralph of Caen,48 the Gesta Francorum Iherusalem peregrinantium of Fulcher of
Chartres,49 the Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem of Raymond d’Aguilers,50 and the
Historia Ierosolimitana of Albert of Aachen.51 Sadly, the Byzantine perspective does not benefit
from the same plentitude of sources. The only near contemporary primary source from the
Byzantine perspective is The Alexiad,52 a biography of Emperor Alexios written by his daughter
Anna.
The Alexiad
The Alexiad, written by Anna Komnena (1083-1153) sometime in the mid-twelfth
century, is a biography of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r.1081-1118), Anna’s father. Of
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particular interest is the extensive account of Alexios’ interactions with western Europeans and
the crusaders during the First Crusade (1096-1099). As an imperial princess, Anna was an
eyewitness to most interactions between crusade leaders and Emperor Alexios and drew
extensively upon these memories during the writing of The Alexiad. This text is doubtlessly the
most important Byzantine primary sources of the First Crusade and is a masterpiece of Byzantine
literature. However, the Alexiad is not without problems for modern scholars. One of the
significant issues with trusting information from The Alexiad is that Anna is extraordinarily
biased in her writing. Allegedly, after a failed coup attempt against her brother, Emperor John II
Komnenos (r.1118-1143), the government banished Anna to a monastery to live out the rest of
her days in exile. Bitter due to her plot’s failure, Anna largely left Prince (and future emperor)
John Komnenos out of the history. Anna was also understandably very biased against the
crusaders and nearly all westerners, referring to them as “barbarians” and even using tribal
language regarding German dukes, calling them “chieftains.”53 Another problem in the Alexiad is
Anna’s unknown sources. Anna herself claims that she was an eyewitness to most events, and
that she learned of those she did not witness from authoritative sources and other eyewitnesses,
such as Alexios’ soldiers.54
These issues garnered Anna a reputation of hysteria, jealousy, and general
untrustworthiness both among later Byzantine historians and within the modern historiographical
tradition until the work of Ostrogorsky in the mid-twentieth century. Rampant sexism within
Byzantine society and western society at large until the mid-twentieth century also contributed
greatly to the dismissal of Anna’s works. Luckily, modern historians have come to appreciate
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Anna’s unique style of writing, her love of and references to classical Greek authors, and the
veracity of her information.55
The Alexiad contains some of the most blatant anti-Latin sentiments in Byzantine
histories, particularly regarding the supposed characteristics of the Latin “barbarian.” Like nearly
all Byzantine works, Anna constantly refers to western Europeans as “barbarians”56 throughout
the text. This trope fits perfectly into the Byzantine world view, in which all who lived outside of
the oikoumene, or the “civilized” world (of course referring to lands controlled by the Byzantine
Empire), were barbarians. However, her anti-Latin sentiments went far further than simply
referring to the crusaders as barbarians. She also had much to say regarding their character and
moral failures. According to Anna, “…all Latins lust after money: for one obol they would sell
even their nearest and dearest.”57 Anna repeats these claims of greed throughout the text,
especially when describing the crusaders. When the rumors of the First Crusade began to reach
the Empire, Anna observed that, “[Alexios] dreaded their arrival, knowing as he did their
uncontrollable passion their erratic character and their irresolution, not to mention [their] other
peculiar traits…their greed for money, for example, which always led them, it seemed, to break
their own agreements without scruple for any chance reason.”58 Anna particularly focuses on the
connection between their supposed greed and their fickleness regarding agreements and treaties.
Doubtlessly Anna, writing decades after the events of the First Crusade, was influenced by the
decision among the crusaders such as Bohemond d’Hauteville and Godfrey of Bouillon to
establish independent states rather than accepting the overlordship of the Byzantine Empire.
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It is important to note that, according to almost every single primary source, the crusaders
made an agreement with Emperor Alexios to return all former Byzantine lands to the Empire.59
When the Byzantines found out about the crusaders reneging on this oath, Anna wrote that, “It
was now clear that these barbarian Franks were violating the oaths taken by them with respect to
Antioch. Despite the large sums of money Alexios had personally spent, despite the many perils
he had faced in transporting these enormous armies from the west to Asia, he had always found
them a haughty, embittered race…the situation was intolerable. Reprisals were absolutely
inevitable, and they would have to be punished for behavior so inhuman.”60 From the Byzantine
point of view, although their troops did not participate directly in the crusade in large numbers
(though there was an important Byzantine contingent at Nicaea and Antioch, more on that later),
Alexios rightly viewed his financial and logistical aid as crucial to the success of the crusade.
Further, all the land the crusaders seized had formerly been under Byzantine rule. Although
Jerusalem and the entirety of Palestine and Syria had been lost to the Arab invasions of the
seventh century, the Byzantines presided over campaigns of reconquest in the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh centuries which resulted in the capture of Antioch in 969. The Seljuks only captured
Antioch from the Byzantines in 1084, merely eleven years before the First Crusade.
It is easy to dismiss Anna’s anti-Latin language throughout the Alexiad as simply
imperial propaganda or representative of Anna’s personal hatred of those who were not
Byzantine. However, it is important to note that, at the time of her writing, Anna was living in
exile, disconnected from the imperial court and on extremely poor terms with her brother,
Emperor John II (r. 1118-1143), and his successor, his nephew Manuel I (r.1143-1180). Surely,
Anna had no illusions that the imperial government would champion her work. Therefore, it is
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highly unlikely that the use of anti-Latin language was a propaganda technique. As contemporary
and subsequent sources all contain similar anti-Latin language the argument that Latin hatred
was unique to Anna is easily dismissed, though these sentiments noticeably intensify as relations
between the Byzantine Empire and western states deteriorated throughout the twelfth and into
the thirteenth century.
Robert the Monk
Robert the Monk was the author of the Historia Hierosolymitana, a modest update and
revision of the anonymous Gesta Francorum. Though Robert himself was not a participant on
the crusade, and thus not an eyewitness to its events, he attended the Council of Clermont in
1095. Carol Sweetenham, the author of a modern translation of the Historia Hierosolymitana,
argues that the work was prepared in 1106 or 1107 as Bohemond d’Hauteville was touring the
west, rallying support for an anti-Byzantine crusade. This work may have been produced as a
part of this effort. Unsurprisingly, Robert vilifies the Byzantines, depicting them as cowards and
Alexios Komnenos specifically as a cartoonishly evil plotter who sought to destroy the crusaders,
while the Franks are depicted as the chosen people of God.
The first of Robert’s many dubious claims regarding crusader-Byzantine interaction is
that the “Prince’s Crusade,” that is, the phase of the crusade when aristocratic leadership had
been solidified, contained no looting whatsoever.61 Instead, Robert outright lies and states that
Bohemond’s contingent was “…positively forced by lack of food to steal and plunder sheep,
cows, rams, pigs, and whatever could be eaten.”62 This retroactive justification of opportunistic
looting reeks of an attempt to absolve Bohemond of the actions taken by his men, perhaps even
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trying to change his reputation as a fierce and brutal warlord. As Sweetenham points out,
Bohemond was an “arch manipulator” who coveted Byzantine territory and viewed the crusade
as a tool to increase his own power.
Regarding the portrayal of Emperor Alexios, it is quite clear what Robert, and by
extension the Normans, thought of him. He wrote, “As [Alexios] saw the camp of the Lord
grow…the crafty emperor – lacking in courage, devoid of sense, and short on wisdom – began to
get extremely angry.”63 The qualities Robert mentions in this passage - craftiness, cowardice, and
stupidity - come up repeatedly throughout crusader descriptions of the Byzantines in the first
four crusades. Though Robert does acknowledge that Alexios promised and delivered some
logistical support, including ferrying the crusaders across the Sea of Marmara, providing
supplies, and sending a contingent of soldiers to aid the crusaders,64 he claims that these
promises were broken even before the Siege of Nicaea (1097) and that the surrender of the city
directly to the Byzantine envoys instead of the crusaders was part of Alexios’ schemes to weaken
the crusaders.65 Crucially, Robert notes that the leaders of the crusade only swore the oath to
return former Byzantine territory back to the Empire because of the necessity of Byzantine
logistical support.66 The city of Constantinople was too fortified and well placed geographically,
and the Byzantine navy too powerful for the crusaders to have simply crossed on their own. The
idea of sailing directly to the Holy Land for crusading purposes came later, mainly during and
after the Third and Fourth Crusades, due to increasing technological developments in
shipbuilding. Further, most of the leaders of the First Crusade did not have powerful navies of
their own which could transport all their troops; besides, one of the key goals of the First
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Crusade was ostensibly to help the Byzantine Empire against the Turks. Bypassing the Empire
entirely would have undermined the justification for the crusade itself and was geographically
impossible.
Importantly, Robert does mention Tatikios, the Byzantine general whom Alexios sent to
join the crusaders with approximately two thousand troops, but states that this officer broke his
oath, lied to the crusaders, and abandoned his post during the siege of Antioch. This event serves
to further cement the Byzantines as traitorous oath breakers in the narrative, while proving their
cowardice and effeminacy.67
There is a strange event in the Historia Hierosolymitana regarding the oath swearing
worthy of note and eerily close to what would happen in the Fourth Crusade. According to
Robert the Monk, “[Raymond of Toulouse], though, directly refused when asked to do homage:
if he had been taken at his word, the whole city along with its inhabitants and emperor would
have been destroyed. But there was no justification for sacking such a royal city and so many
churches consecrated to God, nor for burning so many holy relics or taking them from their
resting places.”68 According to this account, Raymond of Toulouse threatened to sack
Constantinople itself, massacre the inhabitants and the emperor, and loot the holy relics in the
city if he was not released from swearing such an oath. Only the city’s royal and religious
qualities prevented the crusaders from agreeing to this plan, though Robert does not say if this is
a plan that the leaders seriously discussed or was a mere outburst of anger from Raymond. This
account is not corroborated by most other First Crusade sources, all of which portray Raymond
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of Toulouse as the most pro-Byzantine crusade leader. Anna even stated that Alexios trusted
Raymond as he was the most honorable and virtuous of all the leaders of the crusade.69
Therefore, what should we make of this event, given that most other sources do not
corroborate it and it is likely to be an invention of Robert? It is entirely possible that Robert’s
observation represented a desire for ruling Constantinople that many crusader sources implied.
Nearly every source praises the wonders of Constantinople, including the monumental
architecture, churches, and holy relics. However, almost every source simultaneously represented
the Byzantines as decadent, unchristian, and deceitful heretics who were unworthy of ruling such
a beautiful city. This strange cognitive dissonance, admiring Constantinople while hating those
who lived within in, was an important aspect of the stereotype of Byzantine cowardice and
effeminacy. The Byzantines were not men, in western eyes, and therefore were unworthy to rule.
Raymond d’Aguilers
Raymond d’Aguilers, the author of the Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem
(The History of the Franks who Captured Jerusalem), was Count Raymond of Toulouse’s
personal chaplain and accompanied him on the crusade.70 As a close confidant of Raymond of
Toulouse, d’Aguilers had access to authoritative information from the count himself. As Count
Raymond formed a personal friendship with Emperor Alexios and was the most pro-Byzantine
crusade leader, one might expect Raymond d’Aguilers to hold a similar pro-Byzantine opinion.
Therefore, it is shocking that d’Aguilers was one of the most anti-Byzantine writers of the
crusades (only topped by Odo of Deuil, the Second Crusade author). Despite his liege’s
friendliness towards the Byzantines, d’Aguilers, just like Robert the Monk, portrays the
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Byzantine Empire and Emperor Alexios as obstacles that the crusaders had to overcome, indeed
as another test from God before they could take the Holy Land.
The Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem was written in 1102, very shortly after
the success of the crusade in 1099.71 Although titled the “history of the Franks,” the focus of the
text is Count Raymond of Toulouse, his actions, and the events his contingent witnessed.
According to John Hill, the translator, d’Aguilers “hated the Greeks.”72 Not only did he frame
the Byzantines as treacherous and plotting against the crusade, he also invented promises which
any Byzantine Emperor would almost certainly never have made, such as allowing a foreign
mercenary army to loot an important imperial city like Nicaea.73
Raymond d’Aguilers’ anti-Byzantine sentiments are not merely off hand comments in the
narrative. Rather, Alexios’ treachery, cowardice, and hatred towards the crusaders form a core
component of d’Aguilers’ narrative, despite his liege’s high opinion of Alexios and the
Byzantines. When describing the contingent’s march through the Balkans, d’Aguilers wrote that,
“…we believed that Alexios and his followers were our Christian brothers and confederates. But
truly with the savagery of lions they rushed upon peaceful men…these brigands, operating by
night, slew our people in droves…and stole what they could from them.”74 Clearly, d’Aguilers
considered the raids by highwaymen and bandits on crusader camps as personally directed and
ordered by Emperor Alexios, despite the fact that imperial officials, such as governor John
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Komnenos, promised peace and safe conduct through the Byzantine Balkans,75 while crusader
armies were simultaneously raiding and looting these territories.
When letters from Emperor Alexios were sent to Raymond’s contingent, promising
cooperation, alliance, and brotherhood, d’Aguilers summarily dismissed these as “…empty
words, for before and behind, to the right and left, Turks, Cumans, Uzes, and…Pechenegs and
Bulgarians were lying in wait for us.”76 The Byzantine Empire made extensive use of
mercenaries, especially those recruited from peoples whom the crusaders and westerners viewed
as barbarians, such as the Pechenegs and Turks. The Byzantine army had suffered greatly from
the loss of Anatolia and relied upon mercenaries much more than in previous centuries. When
the crusaders encountered these mercenaries, however, they understood the use of these peoples
as unholy and meant to defeat the crusaders. In fact, Alexios sent these troops to prevent the
crusaders from looting and terrorizing the local population.
Referring to the Byzantine troops as “the enemy,” d’Aguilers states that “on all sides we
were confronted with the Emperor’s deceit.”77 In the same vein, he also refers to the imperial
soldiers as “treacherous” for capturing the Bishop of Le Puy when he was “wandering” from
camp.78 This supposed treachery was the pretext with which the crusaders justified clashing with
imperial forces in the Balkans, yet d’Aguilers undermines his own justifications in the next
paragraph by highlighting a brutal display of hostility. He wrote, “Soon thereafter we arrived at
Roussa, a town where the open contempt of its citizens so strained our customary forbearance
that we seized arms, broke down the outer walls, captured great booty, and received the town in
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surrender. We then left after we had raised our banner over the town…”79 D’Aguilers admits that
the crusader contingent of Raymond of Toulouse attacked and sacked the city of Roussa80 for no
reason other than the “open contempt” of the citizenry. Raymond does not present this attack as a
shameful example of the undisciplined nature of the army, but as one of the first triumphs of the
crusade. In Raymond’s Historia, the Byzantines were just as much enemies to the crusade as the
Muslims were, and therefore the crusaders’ victories over the Byzantines were just as worthy of
note and inclusion into the narrative as the victories in the Holy Land.
When Raymond of Toulouse and his contingent finally arrived in Constantinople,
d’Aguilers begrudgingly admits that Emperor Alexios hosted an honorable welcome for the
count, and even refers to him by the actual Byzantine title “Basileus,” though continues to
denounce the “…most fraudulent and abominable treachery of the Emperor…”81 D’Aguilers
claims that Count Raymond was only won over to meet Alexios due to the Emperor’s bribery of
Raymond’s subordinates.82 When they met, Count Raymond charged Alexios with betraying the
crusaders, while Alexios noted the widespread looting the crusaders committed during their
march. D’Aguilers claims that Alexios promised to provide compensation to the crusaders, but
that this resolution to the dispute was “contrary to justice.”83
The strange episode in Robert the Monk, where Count Raymond threatened to sack
Constantinople, is alluded to in d’Aguilers’ work. When the other crusade leaders pressured
Raymond into accepting a compromise with Alexios by, Count Raymond sought revenge for his
“unjust treatment.” However, Godfrey of Bouillon and Count Robert of Flanders refused to
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support a fight against the Byzantines, while Bohemond d’Hauteville threatened to side with
Alexios in such a fight.84 In the end, Raymond swore a different oath, promising not to harm the
emperor, his subjects, or his property. D’Aguilers did not mention any stipulations of returning
former Byzantine lands to the Emperor or Count Raymond and Alexios’ friendship, no doubt as
an effort to vilify the Byzantines as much as possible. If d’Aguilers portrayed a just and
honorable man like Count Raymond as forming a friendship with Emperor Alexios, it would
undermine this vilification and potentially make Alexios into a more sympathetic figure.
Fulcher of Chartres
Fulcher of Chartres was an eyewitness and participant in the First Crusade in the
contingent of Stephen of Blois and Count Robert of Normandy. Fulcher later joined Baldwin of
Boulogne’s85 contingent as his personal chaplain and accompanied him to Edessa and later
Jerusalem, where Fulcher wrote the Gesta Francorum Iherusalem peregrinantium, a history of
the First Crusade and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, covering the period between 1096-1127.86
Fulcher divided the work into three books, the first of which detailed the First Crusade, the
second the reign of Baldwin I of Jerusalem, and the third the reign of Baldwin II. There are
significant differences in Fulcher’s account of the crusade than in the works of most other
authors. Notably, Fulcher’s first book contains little anti-Byzantine language or sentiments.
Fulcher portrays the Byzantines as just as Christian as westerners, and clearly viewed the
justification for the crusade as aiding these eastern Christians. Moreover, Fulcher does not
describe Emperor Alexios as a treacherous, lying plotter as he is in most other western sources,
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but as a mostly reasonable, faithful ruler who worked with the crusaders to aid them in their
goals. Anti-Byzantine language and statements do not appear until after the crusader capture of
Antioch,87 and especially after the capture of Jerusalem, where Fulcher sharply pivots towards
denouncing the Byzantines for their actions. Books two and three are full of these denunciations,
and Fulcher is sympathetic to Bohemond’s subsequent invasion of the Byzantine Empire after
the First Crusade.88 An explanation for this pivot, as argued by the translator of the text Frances
Rita Ryan, is that Fulcher gained access to Raymond d’Aguilers’ work and the Gesta
Francorum, both of which were decidedly anti-Byzantine sources.89
At the start of Fulcher’s narrative, he argues that the First Crusade was genuinely meant
to help Eastern Christians.90 He did not lambast them as heretics and treated their religious
practices with respect; according to Frances Rita Ryan, Fulcher even prayed inside of Byzantine
churches.91 No strong anti-Byzantine language was used, and Emperor Alexios himself was
described as cautious but generous. He described no incidents of combat between Byzantine
forces and the forces of Robert of Normandy on the road to Constantinople,92 and states that the
crusaders were not allowed to enter the city in large groups without hostility, simply noting that
“…it was not agreeable to the emperor for he feared that possibly we would plot some harm to
him…” Fulcher’s tone is conciliatory, and he was not insulted by this suspicion, almost
understanding of the emperor’s caution and respecting it. Despite this suspicion, Fulcher points
out that Alexios ordered that the crusaders be given supplies which were crucial to the cohesion
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of the army, a fact that nearly all other crusade chroniclers ignore.93 Regarding the oath of
loyalty, which so many Western crusade accounts lambast and decry as illegitimate, Fulcher
writes “…it was essential that all establish friendship with the emperor since without his aid and
counsel we could not easily make the journey…”94 Fulcher’s tone regarding this oath is factual
and conciliatory: the crusaders simply would not be able to make it to the Holy Land without the
Byzantine emperor’s help, and they needed to do whatever was necessary to secure this support.
Unlike other crusade accounts, Fulcher also notes and is appreciative of the gifts Alexios
sent to the crusaders.95 This practice of gift giving was a crucial aspect of Byzantine diplomacy
that most crusade writers chose to either ignore or frame as attempts at bribery. As Paul
Stephenson noted in Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier, the practice of distributing gifts, tribute, and
titles was the chief strategy the Byzantine Empire used to deflect threats.96 By granting gifts like
these to the crusaders, Alexios was simply following age old Byzantine tradition, treating the
crusaders just as he would treat any other “barbarians.”
In his account of the recapture of the important Anatolian city of Nicaea, Fulcher does
not accuse the emperor of theft or treachery. Though he does note that the Turks secretly
surrendered the city to imperial forces, despite the fact that the crusaders provided the majority
of the troops for the siege, Fulcher gratefully writes that, “…after all this money was seized [by
the Byzantines] the emperor ordered gifts to be presented to our leaders, gifts of gold and silver
and raiment; and to the foot soldiers he distributed copper coins…”97 This event is crucially
important to understanding the reactions of the crusaders to the capture of Nicaea. Other works,
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such as the Historia Hierosolymitana and the Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem
portray the surrender of Nicaea to the Byzantines directly as a betrayal.98 Further, these sources
all claim that Alexios cheated the crusaders of their loot and payment. Fulcher’s eyewitness
account, which is far more neutral, directly contradicts this interpretation. Emperor Alexios did
want the city of Nicaea to surrender directly to imperial forces to avoid a brutal sack of an
important Byzantine city. However, he did distribute loot in a fair manner, even paying the foot
soldiers instead of merely the princes. This discrepancy in sources suggests that the other crusade
writers deliberately lied, selecting a narrative of betrayal and treachery to further discredit the
emperor and omitting Alexios’ distribution of wealth.
The shift in Fulcher’s account comes chronologically during the capture of Antioch,
where he entirely omits a discussion of the Byzantine contingent under the command of Tatikios,
and especially after the capture of Jerusalem and the establishment of the crusader states.99 When
discussing Bohemond’s invasion of the Byzantine Empire in 1107-1108, Fulcher writes that,
“The Emperor of Constantinople, Alexios by name, was at that time strongly opposed to our
people. By trickery or open violence, he thwarted or tyrannized over the pilgrims going to
Jerusalem by land or sea. It was for this reason that Bohemond invaded Alexios’ territory…”100
Suddenly, the Gesta Francorum Iherusalem peregrinantium integrates the strong anti-Byzantine
language found in other sources such as the works of Robert the Monk and Raymond d’Aguilers.
From this point onwards, Fulcher employs this hostile language frequently and frames the
Byzantines as enemies of the crusade. One explanation for this shift in tone is that, when Fulcher
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began writing this section, Bohemond d’Hauteville was raising support for an expedition against
the Byzantines.
Ralph of Caen
Ralph of Caen was the author of the Gesta Tancredi, a history of the First Crusade and its
aftermath from the Italo-Norman perspective, specifically that of Bohemond and Tancred
d’Hauteville. Importantly, this work was not a Gesta Francorum or Historia Ierosolomitana, but
a Gesta Tancredi – a book recording and illuminating the deeds of Tancred above everyone else.
Though incomplete (either because of Ralph’s untimely death or the final portion simply not
surviving), the Gesta Tancredi is incredibly illuminating, in that it reveals the perspective of
high-ranking members in the Italo-Norman contingent. The work was, for a long time, as pointed
out by translators David and Bernard Bachrach, a mostly ignored and obscure source.101 As one
might expect from a source from the Norman perspective most sympathetic to Bohemond and
Tancred, the Gesta Tancredi is virulently anti-Byzantine, even presenting Bohemond’s invasion
of the Byzantine Empire after the First Crusade as an extension of the crusade itself.102 Ralph
takes every opportunity to defame and insult the Byzantines, referring to Emperor Alexios
merely as the “King of the Greeks” instead of emperor,103 and generally portrays the Byzantines
in a similar manner to Raymond d’Aguilers and Robert the Monk, as treacherous, deceitful
cowards who hindered the progress of the crusade.
Opening with Bohemond’s contingent marching through the Balkans, Ralph makes his
feelings regarding the Byzantines quite clear. He wrote, “[Bohemond] feared the ambushes of
the Greeks since they had a habit of attacking even those whom they had earlier invited as
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guests…destruction had to be wrought on these miserable people…”104 Although at this point
during the march any bandits would have likely been Bulgarians or Serbs, Ralph and the
Normans understood them to be Greeks and as such placed the blame on them. When
Bohemond’s contingent encountered these highwaymen and defeated them, Ralph wrote that
“But just as they had not shown mercy to anyone, now they were not worthy of pity by anyone.
This weak people were struck down…they learned that one hundred of them were not equal to
one [Frank].”105 The slaughter of the “Greek” raiders was glorified, and Ralph afforded no
sympathy to those killed by the Normans. He deemed the Greeks to be “weak people” who
deserved no mercy for their crimes. Naturally, Ralph also placed the blame for such attacks
squarely at the feet of the emperor.
When Bohemond, the lifelong enemy of the Byzantines, took the conciliatory step of
accepting Alexios’ letters and travelling to Constantinople to meet with the emperor, Ralph
castigated him, writing, “Bohemond, who was captivated by the superficial sweetness of these
words, did not sense the poison hidden below the surface. Furthermore, the promise of the riches
of Constantinople, for which he had long shed blood [for]…led him astray.”106 Ralph claims that
Alexios’ letters were poisoned, and that the great wealth of the Byzantine capital seduced him,
corrupting his morals. The language of poison, corruption, and being led astray would have
certainly evoked biblical images of the Devil to contemporary readers. Snake-like, Alexios
tempted and corrupted the virtuous and honorable Bohemond. Ralph also claims that the other
leaders were also “corrupted” by Alexios’ gifts and calls the emperor “perfidious”107 and a
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tyrant.108 In reality, Alexios summoned all the crusade leaders to Constantinople to attempt to
impose a measure of organization and leadership upon the crusade and halt the raiding of
Byzantine lands. Naturally, Tancred, the hero of Ralph’s story, recognizes the supposedly
poisoned bait, and refuses to meet with Alexios or swear the oath of allegiance, which Ralph
deems a “yoke” burdening the leaders of the crusade.109 In sum, Ralph frames Emperor Alexios
as deceitful, treacherous, and a corrupting influence upon the supposedly virtuous crusaders,
while conveniently excusing or omitting instances of blatant aggression or raiding by the
crusaders.
A diplomatic incident worth noting occurred after Tancred reluctantly swore the oath to
Alexios. As previously mentioned, the giving of gifts was an integral and serious aspect of
Byzantine diplomacy, and Alexios made use of this tool with the crusaders no less than he did
with the Turks and other foreign peoples. When Alexios offered to grant the crusade leaders
anything they desired as a gift, rewarding them for agreeing to take the oath of loyalty, Tancred
callously demanded the imperial tent.110 Contrary to what one might expect, Alexios did not
order any punishment for Tancred, although he was not pleased with this insult. However,
Alexios’ friend and most loyal general, George Palaiologos, physically assaulted Tancred
immediately after the brazen suggestion.111 The Alexiad corroborates this event as well, certainly
meaning that this event occurred and was not a mere invention of Ralph.112
To excuse the oath breaking of Tancred and Bohemond, Ralph frames the oath as a
burden illegally imposed upon the crusaders. Alexios corrupted and seduced the leaders with
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magnificent gifts, and then compelled them with force to agree to give back all former Byzantine
lands, preventing their passage if they refused. Ralph also claims that the Norman contingent
broke their oath because Alexios did not join the crusade with the whole Byzantine army, as they
claimed he had promised. He argues that they would have served Alexios as his liegemen if he
had brought the army, but his support in logistics and tactical advice was not enough.113
Strangely, Ralph places much of the blame for Alexios not coming to help on Stephen of Blois,
who fled the siege of Antioch and returned to warn the emperor of the army’s plight and
dissuade him from sending a Byzantine army.114 This is perhaps the only time that Ralph does
not blame Alexios for not sending more support to the crusaders. Of course, Ralph omits most
information regarding Byzantine support of the crusade, not even mentioning Tatikios or the
Byzantine contingent at the siege of Antioch.115
Finally, regarding the creation of the crusader states, Ralph writes, “The great strength of
the Greek kingdom would not capture Jerusalem…it was not appropriate to hand over these
captured cities to such defenders as the Greeks. It was the Franks who alone were capable of this
type of protection.”116 Though he admits that the “Greek kingdom” possesses great strength, one
can easily detect his dismissive and condescending attitude regarding their military capability to
defend these lands. He argues that, because the Byzantines formerly ruled and then lost these
lands, they were simply unfit to rule over the Levant or provide for its defense. However, the
Franks, who had never previously ruled these lands in any capacity, were its rightful rulers, as
they “alone” possessed the necessary strength and capability to defend them. Crusade authors
often frame the Franks as the chosen people of God, the successors to the Israelites, but no other
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author quite so explicitly lays out the reasoning for the creation of the crusader states and the
refusal to return formerly Byzantine lands to the Byzantine Empire.

Albert of Aachen
Albert of Aachen, also known sometimes as Albert of Aix, was the author of the Historia
Ierosolimitana, the most complete, detailed, and factually accurate First Crusade narrative,
according to the translator Susan Edgington.117 This is even more interesting as Albert was one
of the few crusade authors who did not personally participate in the crusade, instead relying upon
firsthand testimony from veterans. Sadly, almost nothing is known of Albert personally, and he
remains an obscure figure. Edgington argues that Albert was completely independent of the other
crusade authors, using only his own sources,118 and that he was remarkably tolerant towards the
Byzantines and the Muslims. He does not engage in the common crusader trope that the Muslims
were idol worshippers and pagans and uses positive and laudatory language regarding Emperor
Alexios and the Byzantines. Further, Albert is even critical of the crusaders and their actions,
chastising them for looting in Hungary and the Byzantine Empire, and lamenting their pointless
cruelty against the Jews prior to the crusade and to the Muslims upon capturing Jerusalem.119
Albert is also one of the few First Crusade authors to include a narrative account of the “People’s
Crusade,” the first group of crusaders under Peter the Hermit.
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According to Albert, when the People’s Crusade began and the undisciplined crusaders
entered into the Balkans, “…a [Hungarian] count…Guz, by name…had assembled a band of
armed soldiers and had entered into a very wicked plot with the said duke, who was called
Nichita,120 prince of the Bulgars…that the duke…would vanquish and kill the vanguard of
Peter’s army, while Guz would pursue and behead the men at the rear…so that they might snatch
and share…all the spoils…”121 He argues that, when Peter found out about this plot and attacked
the Hungarians, he was justified in doing so, despite the Hungarians being fellow Christians.122
After the defeat of the Hungarians, the crusaders continued into the Balkans, where the
Byzantine governor of Bulgaria Doux Niketas granted them a license to buy food, only requiring
that the crusaders send hostages. Albert writes that these were returned “faithfully”123and that
Niketas behaved rationally and honorably. When hostilities broke out again, Albert blames the
crusaders for drunkenly burning seven Bulgarian mills in a violent dispute with a Bulgarian
merchant, calling it a “wicked repayment for [the Bulgarians’] kindness” and the crusaders’
actions “evil.” 124
When Emperor Alexios finally contacted Peter the Hermit and the leaders of the Peoples’
Crusade, Albert admires Alexios’ clemency, as he forgave all transgressions against the
Byzantine people and leaders and agreed to furnish supplies for the army if they did not remain
in any Byzantine city for longer than three days and ceased from raiding their lands.125 Peter
accepted these terms, but the undisciplined nature of the army meant that sporadic instances of
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raiding continued. He also notes that Alexios commanded the crusaders to lodge far from
Constantinople to prevent any chance of looting within the capital city.126
Regarding Alexios’ character, Albert writes that he was a “magnificent and most famous
emperor”127 who was “most Christian.”128 Later in the account, Albert also labels Alexios a
“glorious and most powerful emperor.”129 Far from the scathing remarks of the other writers, it is
clear from the choice of words “magnificent,” “most Christian” and “most famous” that Albert
admired and respected Alexios, and at the very least did not accept any version of events
claiming that Alexios backstabbed the crusaders or cheated them in any way.
Albert’s account of Byzantine logistical aid is further evidence of this positive view of
Alexios and the Byzantines. He writes that the emperor provided Peter and his army with money,
licenses to buy food, and naval vessels to cross the Bosporus into Anatolia.130 Crucially, Albert
stresses that the Byzantine merchants sold goods to the crusaders “fairly and in good
measure.”131 When Godfrey de Bouillon’s army crossed the Danube promising not to raid
Byzantine territory, Albert notes that Alexios granted Godfrey’s army “…a wonderful abundance
of food…”132 Finally, Albert frequently notes Alexios’ generous gifts to the crusaders, both the
leaders and the army, throughout the text.133 These crucial acts of Byzantine logistical and
financial support are frequently omitted by crusade writers from their accounts in order to frame
Alexios as a villain.
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When troops from the Princes’ Crusade, specifically the contingent of Godfrey de
Bouillon, arrived at the Danube frontier, Albert writes that Alexios ordered the Byzantine army
to intercept the group and convey the message that the emperor would grant them a license to
purchase food if they refrained from raiding Byzantine territory. Labelling this act an example of
the emperor’s “goodwill,” Albert presents this request from the Byzantines as rational and fair.134
A curious incident occurred at this time which Albert cites as the cause for much of the
conflict between the crusades and the Byzantines. According to Albert, “…certain strangers from
the land of the Franks arrived secretly in the duke’s135 camp, and they warned him very seriously
to beware the tricks and poisoned garments of the emperor, and his deceitful words, and under no
circumstances to go into his presence…but to mistrust everything he offered to them. The duke,
therefore, warned by the strangers…did not go into the emperor’s presence at all.”136The
language used in this incident, such as the supposed “deceit” of the emperor, his “poisoned” gifts
and his “tricks” are suspiciously similar to the language employed by Robert the Monk,
Raymond d’Aguilers, and the Gesta Tancredi. A subsequent passage illuminates who these
secret Franks really were.
Soon after, Godfrey accepted the warnings of these strangers and began raiding
Byzantine lands. At this time, he received more messengers, except this time they clearly
identified themselves. According to Albert, the messengers stated that “Bohemond, most wealthy
prince of Sicily and Calabria, asks you not to return to friendship with the emperor in any way,
but to withdraw into [Bulgaria] and [winter] there, confident that at the beginning of March,
Bohemond himself will be there with all his forces to help you overcome this emperor and
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invade his domain.”137 Apparently, Godfrey was put off by this blatant call for invasion of
Christian lands during crusade, and instead sought to make peace with Alexios, to which the
emperor promptly agreed.138 However, this incident clearly demonstrates that Bohemond sought
to sow dissent between the crusade leaders and the Byzantine emperor, and used his messengers
to spread slanderous messages. The Normans would repeat this tactic during the Second
Crusade, with similar disastrous effects.
On the question of crusader leaders swearing oaths to Alexios, Albert writes that all the
crusade leaders swore to become vassals of the emperor and return all former Byzantine territory
to his rule.139 Though he notes that early in the crusade there were false rumors that Alexios had
imprisoned crusade leaders who came to Constantinople,140 he does not present the oath
swearing as a particularly contentious event, and certainly does not depict it as forced upon the
crusaders by Alexios and the Byzantines. Albert specifically notes that Bohemond swore these
oaths as well and agreed to become a vassal of the emperor, no doubt due to Bohemond’s later
reneging of this oath and subsequent wars with the Empire. He also corroborates Anna’s account
of Count Raymond and Emperor Alexios’ friendship and makes no mention of any threats from
Raymond to attack Constantinople.141
Crusade authors often used the events of the siege of Nicaea, as previously mentioned, to
demonstrate the teachery of the Byzantines, as they supposedly cheated the crusaders of their
rightfully earned loot. Albert tells a quite different tale. Albert provides detailed information
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about Byzantine logistical and financial support for the crusade army. However, specifically
regarding this siege, Albert emphasizes that “…merchants were striving to race across the sea
with ships full of rations, corn, meat, wine, barley, and oil… [the crusaders] rejoiced in the
abundance…”142 This logistical support was crucial in the crusaders’ ability to successfully
maintain the siege of the city. Without these Byzantine supplies, the crusaders would have been
forced to live off the land entirely, ranging far from camp, leaving them open to raids which the
Turks were experts at conducting.
Albert also includes the earliest mention of Tatikios in any crusader source, noting that
Alexios sent him to join the crusaders with a Byzantine contingent. His role as a commander143
was to lead the Byzantine contingent and provide the crusade leaders with tactical, logistical, and
geographic advice. He specifically mentions Tatikios’ geographic and tactical knowledge, along
with his experience fighting Turks, as reasons for his presence.144 Albert further attributes the
surrender of Nicaea directly to imperial forces to Tatikios’ negotiations with the Turkish garrison
of the city.145 Albert’s portrayal of Tatikios in later events, however, falls far more in line with
the other crusade accounts. He notes that he was present at the siege of Antioch, but that he fled
“terror-stricken” and “in false faith.” He argues that Tatikios promised to beseech Alexios to
send troops and supplies to aid the ailing crusader army, but that since this aid never
materialized, Tatikios must have acted in bad faith.146
This condemnation of Tatikios is rather strange, as Albert notes shortly afterwards that
certain crusader princes, such as Count Hugh of Vermandois, had abandoned the siege of
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Antioch and personally informed Emperor Alexios that the situation at Antioch was hopeless and
that he should not send any aid.147 Even Ralph of Caen, who is usually quite hateful towards
Alexios, notes that he acted based on the information given to him by Hugh and does not appear
to blame Alexios for this.
The Historia Ierosolimitana contains the most direct admission that Bohemond and the
crusaders betrayed their oath to the emperor by keeping Antioch for themselves, instead of
returning the city to Byzantine rule. Albert writes that, “They had vowed to him148 that if
Antioch were taken, they would keep it for him…because it was a part of his kingdom, like
Nicaea, and they would restore it to his sovereign power.”149 Most crusade sources are very light
on details regarding the loyalty oath and what specific stipulations the oath entailed. This
passage in Albert’s work specifically states that the crusaders promised to return Antioch to the
Byzantine Empire if they captured it. Though not related to anti-Byzantine language and
sentiments, this passage proves that reliable information was available to crusade writers that the
crusaders betrayed their oath by refusing to return Antioch. However, Albert is the only western
historian of the First Crusade to mention this, even comparing this decision directly to their
actions at Nicaea, which was under Turkish rule and had formerly been a Byzantine city, just like
the events at Antioch.
After Bohemond had seized Antioch and established himself as the Prince of Antioch, he
sought to enlarge his principality through conquest. One of his main targets was the city of
Latakia, also known as Laodikeia or Laodicea, which was an important Byzantine city on the
Syrian coast. Raymond of Toulouse who, had captured the city, kept his oath to Alexios and
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returned the city to Byzantine rule. In 1099, Bohemond attempted to take Laodikeia by siege.
According to Albert, Bohemond justified this oath breaking and attack upon the Byzantines
because “…the citizens of Latakia were false Christians, and always opposed to the Christian
brothers…”150 This is one of the first instances among western crusader sources labelling the
Byzantines “false Christians” or “heretics.” This idea, however, would become far more
common and prominent in subsequent crusades, no doubt due to Bohemond’s propaganda and
calls for an anti-Byzantine crusade in the early 12th century.
Albert does discuss this attempted “crusade” against the Byzantines. Between 1104 and
1108, Prince Bohemond canvassed France and Italy, recruiting troops, raising money, and
spreading slanderous accounts of the treachery of Alexios, the heresy of the Byzantines, and the
need for a crusade against these traitors to the faith and the crusade. Gaining the support of the
pope, Bohemond invaded the Byzantine Balkans in late 1107, laying siege to Dyrrachium.151
Though he was decisively defeated and forced to submit to Byzantine authority, he died shortly
afterwards, and the Principality of Antioch would remain an independent thorn in the side of the
Byzantine Empire until Emperors John and Manuel Komnenos would subjugate the principality
in the mid-12th century. This event does, however, demonstrate that Bohemond’s propaganda and
anti-Byzantine sentiments were strong enough to lead to such an expedition. However, its
subsequent military failures, such as the lack of zealous recruits joining this expedition equal to
the amount of those who joined the First Crusade, demonstrates that not everyone in Europe
bought Bohemond’s propaganda.
SECOND CRUSADE SOURCES
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The Second Crusade, which lasted from 1147-1150, is by far the most obscure of the first
four numbered crusades in both historiographical and historical perspectives. This is primarily
due to a dearth of primary sources: among western sources, only that of Odo of Deuil focuses on
the expedition to the Middle East, and John Kinnamos is the only Byzantine historian to write an
extensive account of the Byzantine perspective during the crusade. Called by Pope Eugene III in
1145 in response to Zengi’s capture of the County of Edessa, one of the crusader states
established after the First Crusade, King Conrad III of Germany (r.1127/1138-1152) and King
Louis VII of France (r.1137-1180) committed to a crusade to restore the lost state.152 Both the
French and German armies separately marched through Byzantine territory in direct emulation of
the armies of the First Crusade, and both armies were under the direct control of each king. The
lack of western sources can perhaps be explained by the fact that the crusade was, at least in the
east, an abject failure.153 The County of Edessa was not reestablished, the German army was
decisively defeated in battle by the Seljuk Turks, and the remnants of the French army barely
managed to arrive in Jerusalem, symbolically completing a pilgrimage, but achieving no
territorial gains for the crusader states. The reigning Byzantine ruler, Emperor Manuel I
Komnenos, grandson of Alexios I Komnenos, emulated his father’s actions and measures taken
to protect the empire from potential western threats. The Second Crusade is of particular
importance in Byzantine-crusader relations, as tensions between the two sides rose to new
heights, even breaking into open conflict between German and Byzantine troops in Thrace.
Although relations between the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos and King Louis VII of
France were better, the primary western source, the De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem of
Odo of Deuil, is by far the most anti-Byzantine western source written throughout the crusading
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period. Meanwhile, the main Byzantine source, John Kinnamos’ Deeds of John and Manuel
Komnenos, glories in Emperor Manuel’s outwitting and “defeat” of the crusaders.
Odo of Deuil
Odo of Deuil was, without doubt, the most anti-Byzantine crusade writer. Odo was Louis
VII’s personal chaplain who accompanied him on the crusade, and as such was an eyewitness to
key events and high-level decision making. According to the translator of his work Virginia
Gingerick Berry, Odo wrote in 1148 while the French army rested in Antioch. With the repeated
defeats of the crusader armies fresh in his mind, Odo wished to warn future crusaders of the
treachery of the Greeks and call for revenge against the Byzantines and the emperor, who, in
Odo’s mind, prevented the success of the crusade.154 Odo’s virulent anti-Byzantine sentiments
are a constant throughout the narrative, and it remained his singular purpose in writing to depict
the Byzantines as treacherous, evil, and anti-Christian as possible.
Odo made the purpose for writing quite clear throughout the De Profectione. He states
that the advice within the work is meant to guide and advise future pilgrims and crusaders,
hoping that they “…will be more cautious because of our experiences.”155 Odo does not focus
solely on denouncing the Byzantines. He also provides crucial details regarding geography,
roads, and the best routes. However, regarding the Byzantines, Odo writes that, “…[we] will
always have something to bewail if the sons of these men do not avenge their parents’ deaths. To
us who suffered the Greeks’ evil deeds, however, divine justice, and the fact that our people are
not accustomed to endure shameful injury for long, give hope of vengeance…we shall follow the
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course of our misfortunes so that posterity may know about the Greeks’ treacherous actions.”156
This is perhaps the most blatant call for violence against the Byzantines by any crusade author.
Odo explicitly states that the wrongs he attributes to the deception of the Byzantines must be
avenged, and that he is writing this work in order to record these wrongs for future generations of
Frenchmen. Odo meant for future generations to read his account widely and to spread antiByzantine sentiment throughout France.
When King Louis VII, after sending ambassadors ahead to Emperor Manuel, received
messages from the emperor, Odo claims that the Byzantines engaged in excessive flattery and
made spurious promises which they failed to fulfil.157This accusation becomes a trend in Odo’s
work, as he constantly accuses Byzantine ambassadors of flattery, excessive praise, and
circumlocution. He even claims that the French King and his bishops had to intervene during the
Byzantine ambassadors’ introductions, to tell them to get to the point.158 Titles were a crucial
aspect of Byzantine government, hierarchy, and diplomacy, and it was not unexpected for
Byzantine ambassadors to engage in, what western elites might perceive as, excessive flattery.
In his discussion of Byzantine deceit, Odo confirms that Normans spread anti-Byzantine
rumors, and Odo crucially indicates that he wholeheartedly agreed with them rather than dismiss
them as propaganda. Odo wrote, “There were men in the assembly who said that the Greeks, as
they had learned either by reading or by experience, were deceitful. Would that the King and his
men…had entertained some fear of deceitful wiles! But because mortal wisdom and prudence do
not exist against God, they who were destined to die chose the route through Greece.”159 These
men, Odo confirms shortly afterwards, were Italo-Normans from the Kingdom of Sicily. This
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proves that the Norman propaganda machine was still working in earnest, despite the death of
Bohemond decades prior. This warning certainly made an impression upon Odo, as he chose to
include it in the narrative, exclaiming that King Louis should have heeded their words.
Just like the during the First Crusade, Emperor Manuel wished for the crusaders to swear
an oath not to harm Byzantine lands and restore any lands retaken to their rule. After long
negotiations, the French delegation “…swore to the security of the Greek realm on behalf of the
king, and by a similar oath on behalf of their emperor the Greeks confirmed the promise of a
sufficient market, suitable exchange, and other privileges…”160 This agreement demonstrates
that both the Byzantines and crusaders had learned from their previous interactions, and the
Byzantines sought to provide enough supplies to maintain discipline and prevent looting among
the crusader armies. However, Odo notes that the German army, which they marched in the wake
of, were “…plundering everything,” burning towns, and “…were unbearable even to us.”161
Unfortunately, there is less information regarding the German expedition than the French, but
these actions demonstrate that whatever accommodations the Byzantines attempted to provide
for the Germans failed, resulting in widespread destruction.
The French expedition resulted in far less destruction in Byzantine lands, at least at first.
However, Odo argues that Manuel committed perjury by setting up unsuitable markets, claiming
that the Byzantine coinage was worth less than other countries.162 He also notes that the terrified
Byzantines refused to admit the crusader troops into their towns, instead lowering supplies down
from the walls. They could not transfer sufficient amounts of supplies in this way, so the French
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troops “…procured supplies for themselves by plunder and pillage.”163 Luckily, this looting did
not result in an outbreak of full-scale conflict between the French and Byzantines, and the French
army and King Louis VII made it to Constantinople.
Here, however, the French learned of diplomatic developments that greatly undermined
Franco-Byzantine relations. Odo writes that Emperor Manuel negotiated a twelve-year truce with
the Seljuk Turks, labeling this a “crime” and stating that “…his treachery was increased and
made manifest.”164 At this point, the Turks had inhabited Anatolia for close to one hundred
years, and the Byzantine Empire frequently negotiated truces with them. Furthermore, the
Byzantines conducted diplomacy with all peoples, including their eastern neighbors, out of sheer
necessity. Regarding this truce specifically, Manuel almost certainly concluded peace in order to
deal with the crusaders marching through his territory. An absent emperor or imperial army
would leave the countryside and cities vulnerable to raids or attacks by the crusaders. Based on
the Byzantines’ understanding of the First Crusade, there every reason to believe that Manuel
viewed the crusaders rightfully as a threat to the Empire and freed up his diplomatic and military
resources as necessary.
Odo, however, had only just begun his scathing criticisms of Byzantine practices. When
he learned of Greek religious practices, he wrote, “Perhaps this condition would have been
bearable…if blasphemy had not been added. For instance, if our priests celebrated mass on
Greek altars, the Greeks afterwards purified them…as if they had been defiled…we heard of an
ill usage of theirs which should be expiated by death; namely that if…one of our men…has been
baptized in the Roman way, they rebaptize him…we know other heresies of theirs…it was for
these reasons that the Greeks had incurred the hatred of our men, for their error had become
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known even among the lay people. Because of this, they were judged not to be Christians, and
the Franks considered killing them a matter of no importance…”165 The language in this passage
is stunningly blunt. Odo believed that the Byzantines religious practices were blasphemous and
heretical and claims that even the common soldiers in the army learned of their religious
practices and hated them. Therefore, he stated that they viewed the Byzantines as no longer
Christians, thus equating them with the enemies of the crusades such as the Turks and Arabs.
Because they were no longer Christians, the crusaders could slay them as legitimate enemies in
war. This is the most blatant example of dehumanization in any of the crusade texts.166
Odo also supported the conquest of Constantinople and seizing it for the crusaders.
According to Odo, “…the Bishop of Langres, however, urged us to take the city. He proved that
the walls…were weak, that the people were inert, and that by cutting the conduits the fresh water
supply could be withdrawn…[and] that if that city were taken it would not be necessary to
conquer the others, since they would yield obedience voluntarily…[and] that Constantinople is
Christian only in name…[since] her emperor had ventured a few years previously to attack the
Prince of Antioch…and [replaced Catholic bishops] with heretics…”167 The ideas presented in
this argument are eerily similar to the events of the Fourth Crusade. The idea that taking
Constantinople would force the rest of the Byzantine Empire to yield was replicated by the
crusaders in 1204, who were later shocked that they had to venture out and conquer the rest of
the empire from local magnates who had broken away and formed independent realms instead of
submitting to the rule of crusader kings. As will be seen below, authors writing about the Fourth
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Crusade replicate the idea that Constantinople was Christian in name only, who praise the wealth
and relics of the city while condemning its inhabitants, their culture, and their society. Odo
himself later states in his text that “Constantinople is arrogant in her wealth, treacherous in her
practices, corrupt in her faith…”168 This was an important justification for attacking or preparing
an attack upon a city renowned in the Christian world as a holy city of wonders, full of
monumental churches and holy relics. It is also interesting that Odo would justify such an attack
by reminding readers that Manuel had subjugated the Principality of Antioch and forced the
acceptance of an Orthodox patriarch in the city, replacing the Catholic one. This is a further
entrenchment of the idea that the Byzantines were heretics hostile to the Catholic faith, an idea
that is not present in previous crusades except in language promulgated by the Normans.
The ultimate insult to the Byzantines contained in De Profectione is Odo’s label of
Emperor Manuel I Komnenos as “the idol.” This label implies that the Byzantines, who had great
reverence for their emperors, especially those as successful as Manuel, were idolaters. Idolatry
was a great crime in Abrahamic faiths, in direct contradiction to the Ten Commandments. The
implication that the Byzantines were idolaters was to further reinforce the idea that they were not
Christians, but enemies of the faith equal to the Muslims.169
One further comment worth elaborating upon is Odo’s chastising of the Byzantines for
allowing Anatolian cities to fall into ruins. He commented, “…the lazy [Greeks] would have lost
all [to the Turks] if they had not defended themselves by importing knights from various
nations…Nevertheless, they always lose…Nicomedia shows us this…her lofty ruins testify to
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her former glory and her present masters’ inactivity.”170 This idea is very similar to that
propagated by some First Crusade writers, such as Ralph of Caen, who argued that the
Byzantines were not strong or manly enough to defend such glorious cities, but that only the
Franks were capable of such feats.171 Odo presented the Byzantines as men who “…degenerated
entirely into women; putting aside all manly vigor…”172 were simply not strong enough to
defend Anatolia or the Holy Land; that was a “man’s job,” unfit for the womanly Greeks, but a
job the Franks were manly enough to carry out.
Therefore, Odo of Deuil presents the most blatant anti-Byzantine sentiment of all the
crusade writers considered thus far. He accused the Byzantines of idolatry, lambasted their
religion, accused them of heresy, called for the conquest of Constantinople, and blamed them
entirely for the failure of the Second Crusade. Although there is no evidence that De Profectione
became a widely read text, the fact that Odo wrote such a scathing account proves that antiByzantine sentiments existed among French elites in the 12th century.
It might be easy for a modern historian to dismiss Odo of Deuil as a hysterical,
xenophobic writer who deserves to be observed in isolation. However, historian Stephen Spencer
argues that “…Odo’s vilification of the Byzantines should be reinstated as a primary…literary
objective…An examination of the emotional rhetoric of De Profectione reveals that Odo’s
defamation of the Greeks was both deeper and more consistent than recent analyses have
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allowed.”173 Therefore, modern scholarship has engaged in deeper rhetorical analysis of this text,
and modern historians should not dismiss Odo outright.
John Kinnamos
John Kinnamos was a Byzantine soldier and bureaucrat during the reigns of Manuel I
Komnenos (r.1143-1180), Alexios II (r.1180-1183), and Andronikos I (r.1183-1185). His text,
The Deeds of John and Manuel Komnenos, was likely written in 1182, during the reign of
Manuel’s son Alexios II, according to Charles Brand.174 Brand also claims that Kinnamos did not
have access to the imperial archives during the composition of this work, as he fell out of favor
of the new imperial court due to his anti-Latin sentiments.175 An unfinished and unrevised work,
the narrative ends abruptly before the disastrous Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176. In this text,
Kinnamos sought to praise John II and his successor Manuel I as much as possible, and to
discredit their enemies. As their enemies were frequently crusaders, crusader states, or
westerners, The Deeds of John and Manuel Komnenos provides an interesting viewpoint
regarding Byzantine views of westerners, and the only near contemporary Byzantine perspective
on the Second Crusade.
One of the main points of contention between the Byzantines and the crusaders was the
seizure of formerly Byzantine lands during the First Crusade. Kinnamos articulates this directly
in a speech allegedly made by Emperor Manuel I responding to Antiochene ambassadors, writing
that “…if someone has robbed something from the other, then it would be just that it be
returned…so why did you not earlier yield Antioch to the Romans, but by force and violence
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steal it from my father?176 Did the Turks not first take it when it belonged to us? …It first
belonged to our state. If you are not ashamed to transgress your own agreements, why do you
come charging us with slighting your rights, while we should justly demand correction from
you?”177 Note the language employed by Kinnamos. He equates the establishment of the
Principality of Antioch to robbery, stolen by force from its rightful owner, the Byzantine Empire.
Further, he accuses crusaders of breaking their own agreements and treaty with the Empire,
particularly the oath they swore in Constantinople prior to fighting the Turks in the First
Crusade.
Regarding the Second Crusade, Kinnamos writes that Manuel abandoned the siege of
Ikonion and made peace with the Seljuk Turks because, “…there increased daily a rumor which
warned that the nations to the west, rebelling by ancestral custom, would invade the Romans’
land in full force.”178 Kinnamos frames the rumors of the new crusade as an “invasion,” just as
Anna Komnene did when describing rumors of the First Crusade. Therefore, it is clear both from
Manuel’s actions and from Kinnamos’ account that the Byzantines viewed the new crusade as a
direct threat to imperial sovereignty. He continues, stating that, “The Normans and French and
the nation of Gauls, and whoever lived around old Rome, and British and Bretons and simply the
whole western array had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to…fight
the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain
possession of the Romans’ land by assault ad trample down everything in front of them.”179
Again, like Anna, Kinnamos argued that the true goal of the crusades was to attack the Byzantine
Empire and steal their land. Viewed through this lens, the ability of Manuel to deflect the
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invaders from Byzantine lands was a great accomplishment. Kinnamos also employs language
which would no doubt bring to a reader’s mind the barbarian invasions of old, with hordes of
peoples in motion, setting out to steal Byzantine land. As Kinnamos presented the crusaders and
all westerners as barbarians, it makes sense that they would act barbarically in this way. He even
compared this “invasion” to that of the Persian king Xerxes in the 5th century BCE, equating the
crusaders to one of the greatest threats to the existence of Greece in its history.180 It is worth
noting, however, that Odo wrote this text forty years after the events of the Second Crusade, and
was likely working with faulty sources.
Regarding the Byzantine demand for the Germans and French to swear an oath similar to
that the crusade leaders swore to Alexios I in the First Cursade, Kinnamos claims that Manuel
only wished to verify that the crusaders had no intent on harming Byzantine lands, and that if
they were being genuine, that swearing the oath would prove their innocence and good
intentions. When they swore the oath, but then later began raiding, he wrote that this was a
manifestation of “…their evil intent.”181 The French and German armies raiding Byzantine lands
was not forgotten by the Byzantines, and Kinnamos used this as proof of their hostile intents
regarding the empire.
For Kinnamos, King Conrad III of Germany takes the place of Bohemond in Anna’s
narrative of the First Crusade. Kinnamos claims that “…a certain barbaric heedlessness drove
him. For in prosperity the barbarian is likely to be exalted and boast beyond measure, but in
disaster he is downcast…”182 Conrad is depicted as a raging, dumb barbarian who stood no
match against the might of the Roman Empire. As a “barbarian,” he possessed the traits the
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Byzantines assigned to barbarians, namely rage, stupidity, and hostility towards the Empire.
Kinnamos compares the whole German army to brutes who were “…cowardly and ignoble and
incapable of either doing or planning anything.”183
Strangely, a far contrast from Odo of Deuil’s account, Kinnamos claims that the French
army was largely well behaved, that Manuel and Louis VII maintained a good relationship, and
that they crossed into Asia after pledging friendship and alliance to Manuel.184 He omits the
many strains in the relations between the French and Byzantines, perhaps as a literary device to
contrast the more “civilized” Louis VII to the raging barbarian Conrad.
Finally, Kinnamos claims that the Antiochenes were “naturally oath breakers…”185 for
breaking free from subjugation under the Byzantine Empire. As demonstrated by the Alexiad,
one of the key components in the Byzantine idea of the Latin barbarian was oath breaking and
deception; that they were naturally disposed to do so, because of their status as a barbarian. This
belief was reinforced by the fact that the rulers of Antioch refused to accept Byzantine suzerainty
except when compelled by force.
THIRD CRUSADE SOURCES
The Third Crusade, sometimes known as the Kings’ Crusade, began in 1189 with the goal
of recapturing Jerusalem, which Saladin, the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt and Syria, conquered in
1187. This crusade is one of the most well-known, as it featured famous figures such as King
Richard “the Lionheart” I of England (r.1189-1199), Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa
(r.1155-1190), and King Philip II “Augustus” of France (r.1190-1223), all of whom joined the
expedition in person. While the French and English contingents reached the Holy Land by sea,
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the army of Frederick Barbarossa marched overland as the armies of the First and Second
Crusades had done. This march brought the Germans into conflict with the Byzantine Empire,
which, under the incompetent rule of Isaac II Angelos (r.1185-1195), attempted to halt the
progress of the German army. At this point, the Byzantine Empire had suffered military defeats
in the west and the east, losing control of large portions of the Balkans, including Serbia, Bosnia,
Croatia, and Bulgaria to rebellions. Unlike the Empire under Manuel I, the Byzantine Empire
under Isaac II was in no position to defeat Frederick’s armies. This power imbalance resulted in
the first instance where the Byzantine Empire caved to crusader demands,
Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris and the Itinerarium Peregrinorum
The Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris, or the History of the Expedition of
Emperor Frederick, is an anonymously written chronicle detailing the Third Crusade from the
German perspective. According to its translator G.A. Loud, the Historia de Expeditione was
completed no later than 1200 CE, and likely beforehand, closer to the events of the Third
Crusade. There is debate regarding the authorship of the text, as historians have noted that
substantial portions of it directly correspond to other sources, and thus this Historia may be a
compilation of sources rather than authored by a single writer.186 Nevertheless, it is generally
agreed that a large portion of the text was written by an eyewitness to the crusade.187 Like most
crusade writers before, the author employed a variety of anti-Byzantine stereotypes and language
in discussing the actions of Emperor Isaac and the Byzantines.
When Emperor Frederick marched into the Balkans in 1189, the author wrote that, “…the
Emperor of Constantinople informed [Frederick] that since he had his suspicions, which derived
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from the general opinion of his people, that the expedition to Jerusalem would [in fact] be a
hostile invasion of his kingdom…then if he was not given satisfactory assurances concerning this
suspicion he would not allow us entry …and would resist us in every possible way. [Frederick]
absolved himself and all his men from this suspicion through an oath… [the Byzantines
promised] escort on a good road, the best possible market preparations and free passage across
the sea would be provided. But their tongues were deceitful and ‘the poison of the snake was on
their lips,’ since none of the things that they had sworn was afterwards fulfilled.”188 The author
claims that it was the general opinion of the Byzantine people, not just the emperors or elites,
that the crusade was a hostile invasion of the Empire. He further writes that the Byzantines made
promises to provide fair markets and free passage but compares their deceit to that of evil men
possessed by the devil.
The author also claims that the local rulers in Bulgaria were ordered by Emperor Isaac to
ambush crusader forces, writing that, “…he showed the emperor and the whole army that he was
deceitful and most wicked, just like the other Greeks.”189 Notably, the author does not merely
mention that this local ruler was untrustworthy, but that all other Greeks were too, making a
blanket, generalized statement. The writer emphasizes the deceit of the Byzantines, with Isaac’s
letter to Frederick claiming to not have received advanced warning also labelled as a “trick.”190
The author sought to contrast the deceit and sinfulness of the Byzantines, especially Emperor
Isaac, with the holy virtue of Emperor Frederick.
Continuing this trend, when the Serbs and Bulgarians wished to ally with Frederick
against the Byzantines, the author claims that Frederick denied them, saying that he did not wish
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to fight fellow Christians while on crusade, except “He and his men would, however, take up
arms to force their way through, sword in hand, against false Christians who ambushed the
pilgrims of Christ, just as though they were pagans.”191 This passage implies that the Byzantines,
who did attempt to hinder their progress, were “false Christians” and were equivalent to pagans.
This was a telling insult to the Byzantines, placing them at the level of the Muslims in the
western Catholic view, as enemies of the crusade and therefore legitimate targets.
The author does not entirely omit crimes committed by the crusaders marching through
Byzantine territory. For example, he writes that “…the servants and boys of the army were using
the excuse of gathering fodder to plunder the district and were gradually becoming more unruly
and breaking the holy laws that should have been observed to preserve the peace in the land of
the Greeks.”192 However, this incident was not narratively used to generate sympathy with the
Byzantines, but rather to demonstrate the virtue of Frederick, who put a stop to the looting.
When the Germans reached the city of Sofia, the Germans “…found [it] empty and
lacking through poverty in all human comfort, and it was then that the perjury and open deceit of
the Greek emperor and his men began to become clear.”193 This is one of the few examples when
the crusaders accusing the Byzantines of outright treachery were correct. Isaac did, indeed, order
the governor to abandon Sofia and for a Byzantine army to guard the road and prevent the
passage of the German army, as Niketas Choniates corroborates, the then governor of
Philippopolis, who Isaac similarly ordered to abandon his city in the face of the crusader threat.
This was, as Jonathan Harris argues, a grave foreign policy miscalculation.194
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One of the more contentious accusations made by the crusaders, as recorded by the
anonymous author of the Historia De Expugnatione, was that the Byzantine Empire concluded
an alliance with the Ayyubid Sultanate, whose ruler was the famous Saladin. Harris argues that
this was almost certainly untrue, but rather a misunderstanding of typical Byzantine diplomatic
negotiations, and that the Byzantines were actually seeking to gain the title of Protector of the
Holy Sepulcher from Saladin.195 The subtleties of Byzantine diplomacy with Muslim states were
lost upon the crusaders, who believed that the Byzantines opposed them because “… [Emperor
Isaac] wanted to gain the favor of his friend and confederate the Saracen Saladin, the enemy of
the Cross and of all Christians.”196 Naturally, by framing Isaac and the Byzantines as allies of
Saladin, the author firmly placed them into the enemy camp, as opposed to merely an annoyed
neutral third party.
Claiming to have a preserved letter from Frederick to his son and heir Henry VI (r.11911197), the author of the De Expeditione writes that Frederick said, “Since, therefore, our crossing
of the Arm of St George will be impossible until we obtain hostages from the Emperor of
Constantinople, [who must be] without exception men of great distinction and importance, and
we make the whole of Romania subject to our empire, we urgently request your prudent and
noble royal person to send suitable envoys from your serene majesty to Genoa, Venice, Ancona,
Pisa and other places to obtain a squadron of galleys and other vessels, to meet us at
Constantinople around the middle of March, so that they may attack the city by sea while we do
so by land.”197 This is a direct admission that Frederick and the German army was planning to
attack Constantinople, by land and sea, with the full might of the armies and navies of the Holy
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Roman Empire, and that they sought to make the entire territory of the Byzantine Empire subject
to their empire.
Regarding the title of Roman Emperor, the author claims that, when Isaac used the
customary Byzantine title “Emperor of the Romans” and referred to Frederick merely as King,
“…in his customary fashion this same little Greek198 mendaciously called himself the Emperor
of the Romans, while he referred to our most serene and august lord not as Emperor of the
Romans but only as ‘King of the Germans’. Once this letter had been read and translated, the
lord emperor, filled with Divine grace, was unwilling any longer to suffer in silence the rash
pride of this foolish king and the borrowed title of the false emperor… [he said] I am, therefore,
amazed that my brother, your Emperor of Constantinople, usurps for himself an inappropriate
and unwarranted title and glories in an honor that does not belong to him and is utterly foolish,
when he should clearly know that I, Frederick, am in name, word and reality Emperor of the
Romans and always Augustus.”199 The dispute over the titulature of “Roman Emperor” was
nothing new. In the 10th century, Liuprand of Cremona, an ambassador of the Holy Roman
Empire, visited the Byzantine court and engaged in a heated verbal dispute with Emperor
Nikephoros II Phokas over who was the “true” Roman Emperor.200 In the dispute between Isaac
and Frederick, the Byzantines acknowledged Frederick with the neutral title “Emperor of ancient
Rome and King of the Germans.”201
Finally, after Frederick rejected Byzantine diplomatic overtures as insincere, the two
sides finally reached a peace agreement after the Germans had widely raided the Byzantine
countryside and taken many towns and cities. The terms of this treaty were extensive, but from
198

Emperor Issac. Graeculus is typically used contemptuously, not affectionately.
Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris, 64
200
Squatriti, Paolo. The Complete Works of Liuprand of Cremona (Medieval Texts in Translation), 240-246
201
Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris, 65
199

64

the crusaders’ perspective the most important stipulation was that it confirmed that Isaac would
provide Frederick and the crusaders with a fair market, enough transport ships to cross into Asia,
a stable agreed currency exchange rate, and reparations for blocking their path.202 These terms
did not result in any Byzantine territorial losses, but did result in significant financial hardship.
Frederick’s son, Henry VI, would make similar financial demands upon the Byzantine Empire,
though in a more threatening manner, claiming he would invade the Empire if he was not paid an
absurd amount of gold.203
The Itinerarium Peregrinorum is another anonymous Third Crusade narrative text about
which very little is known, including the date of composition and the authorship.204 The author
primarily focuses on the perspective of the forces of King Richard I of England and their
campaigns in Palestine, and therefore contains few references to the Byzantines.205 The text does,
however, contain an important passage regarding crusader-Byzantine interactions and the
Byzantines’ supposed character. When discussing the passage of the German army through
Byzantine territory, the author writes, “…the Greeks know that they themselves are completely
ignorant and unwarlike…Perfidious people, wicked and altogether degenerate…their decline is
the more extraordinary because they used to be so illustrious…”206 This demonstrates that the
author of the Itinerarium too utilized hostile stereotypes regarding the Byzantines, including
familiar narratives of degeneracy, cowardice, and effeminacy.
Niketas Choniates
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Niketas Choniates, a Byzantine imperial bureaucrat, governor, and author, wrote the
Historia, a history of the reigns of Emperors John II, Manuel I, Alexios II, Andronikos I, Isaac
II, and Alexios III and Alexios IV, covering a period from 1118 to 1204. His account of the
Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople, to which he was an eyewitness, is the most
famous aspect of his account, but he also touches upon the Third Crusade. During this crusade,
Niketas was the governor of Philippopolis, an important city in Byzantine Thrace. He wrote the
Historia after the Fourth Crusade, and therefore looked back in recent history bitterly seeking an
understanding as to why the Byzantine Empire fell.
Like all the other Byzantine historians considered thus far, Niketas refers to the beginning
of the Third Crusade as rumors of barbarian movements, which he labels as evil.207 He attributes
the outbreak of hostilities to the failure of Byzantine government officials to gather enough
supplies to satisfy the huge German army, and Isaac’s foolish decision to imprison Frederick’s
envoys. Niketas also claims that he himself received contradictory orders from Emperor Isaac,
first to rebuild Philippopolis’ defenses, and then to tear them down and abandon the city.208
Unlike many historians of the period, Niketas does not aggrandize himself or the emperor
under whom he served, Isaac II (r.1185-1195). Rather, he freely admits that Isaac’s orders were
confused and ineffective, and that Frederick, whom he describes as a barbarian, was a virtuous
barbarian who upheld the terms of the agreements he made with Isaac, while the Byzantine
Emperor frequently broke them.209 Further, he admits that he personally fled from the crusader
army into Byzantine held northern Greece, and that he and his men were forced to loot from his
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own province.210 Therefore, it seems unlikely that Niketas was heavily biased and told lies to
aggrandize the Byzantines or himself.
That does not mean, however, that Niketas refrained from slandering the “barbarians.”
He compared the German practice of men of unequal rank sitting together to hogs in a sty all
mixing together, writing “…just as the swineherds herd all the hogs into a sty without separating
the fat ones and allow them to mingle about, in like manner all the [Germans] stood together.”211
Certainly, comparing the Germans to pigs was a grave insult and illustrates what he truly thought
of them. However, at this point in the narrative, Niketas says comparatively little about the
characteristics of the western barbarians, but at the same time he praises the character of
Frederick.
Niketas wrote of Frederick that, “He was a man who deserved to enjoy a blessed and
perpetual memory…because his burning passion for Christ was greater than that of any other
Christian monarch of his time…thus the man’s zeal was apostolic, his purpose dear to God, and
his achievements beyond perfection.”212 He also emphasized Frederick’s adherence to the oaths
and treaties negotiated between the Germans and Byzantines. This is a rare example of a
Byzantine historian praising a western ruler for his piety and faithfulness during the period of the
crusades.
FOURTH CRUSADE SOURCES
The Fourth Crusade213 is unusual in that it has so many primary sources, particularly
written narrative histories, only comparing to those of the First Crusade in sheer number.214 Each
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of the sources provides a unique perspective of the crusade and has different opinions regarding
its outcome. Geoffrey of Villehardouin, one of the crusade’s leaders, wrote the De La Conquête
de Constantinople, in which he blames those who deserted the army and failed to appear for the
crusade for its results. The main source for the “rank and file” perspective comes from Robert de
Clari and the Devastatio Constantinopolitana. Robert de Clari, whom Angold argues has not
received enough scholarly attention, provides an important and unique perspective from the more
common soldier.215 Robert de Clari argues that the crusade leadership was to blame for the
diversion of the crusade, as they sought an excuse to plunder rich lands to fill their coffers.216 He
provides interesting insight on the perspective of the common soldiers, as he writes that they
were not told of the diversions to Zara and Constantinople until they were already sailing. The
Devastatio, written by an anonymous author who participated in the crusade, blames the
Venetians for the Sack of Constantinople.217 The primary source of the Byzantine perspective,
Niketas, is controversial, as some historians like Angold accuse him of spouting Byzantine
propaganda, while others like Queller accept his firsthand account of the horrors of the Sack of
Constantinople at face value.

Geoffrey de Villehardouin
Geoffrey de Villehardouin wrote in the De La Conquête de Constantinople, according to
the translator of his work Margaret Shaw, an “official history” of the crusade.218 As marshal of
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the county of Champagne, Villehardouin was a member of the crusade leadership, involved in
(though not solely responsible for) high-level decision making. Villehardouin has enjoyed the
most scholarly attention, with historians often preferring his account over Clari’s due to
Villehardouin’s position as a decision-maker.219 Though his account is mostly factually accurate,
Villehardouin, like nearly all crusade writers, held beliefs distorted by stereotypes regarding the
Byzantines, as will be seen in this section. In the early sections of the narrative, Villehardouin
largely refrained from generalizing or hostile comments regarding the Byzantines, but when
conflict began between the two sides, so too did the author’s expressions of hostility utilizing
familiar hostile language.
After installing Alexios IV, Villehardouin claims that the new ruler confided to the
crusaders that “The Greeks…hate me because of you; if you leave me, I shall lose my empire,
and they will put me to death.”220 In this passage, Villehardouin framed the Greeks as the
treacherous villains in a manner similar to earlier crusade narratives. The noble young prince
who was now their ruler feared their treachery and attributed their hatred directly to the fact that
an army of western crusaders installed him. It should not be surprising that the population of
Constantinople that had massacred the western European population of the city twenty-two years
ago would not be thrilled at the prospect of an emperor propped up by a crusader army.221
Therefore, even though Geoffrey did not directly employ hostile language, he still presented the
Byzantines in a traditionally stereotypical manner.
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When the crusaders became unsatisfied with the payments sent by Alexios IV,
Villehardouin wrote that, “…they had now come to realize that the emperor did not intend to
honor any agreement he had made with them, and that he never told them the truth.”222 Again,
although not employing directly hostile language yet, Villehardouin portrays Emperor Alexios
IV in a similar manner to how First Crusade authors presented Alexios I: as a deceitful,
untrustworthy ruler who refused to fulfill his obligations and who was hostile to the crusaders.
Importantly, according to Villehardouin, the co-emperor Isaac II directly told the crusaders upon
their first capture of the city that the terms of the agreement were unrealistic, yet the crusaders
either did not believe him or ignored him.223 Instead of stating that Alexios, ruler of the city of
Constantinople and its immediate surroundings, was unable to fulfill such extravagant terms,
Villehardouin presents Alexios as a liar who was deliberately withholding payment.
When Alexios V, a high-ranking official within the Byzantine bureaucracy, overthrew
and assassinated Alexios IV, Villehardouin wrote, “Have you ever heard of any people guilty of
such an atrocious treachery!”224 To be fair to Villehardouin, the coup against Alexios IV was
particularly brutal, involving the strangulation of the young emperor and such events were not
exactly commonplace in the nations of the west. However, palace coups and popular revolts were
a time-honored Byzantine tradition.225 Some of the most successful and famous Byzantine
emperors, such as Basil I, came to power through the violent, personal murder of their
predecessors. However, Geoffrey mentions this incident as a part of his building evidence for the
treachery of the Greeks.
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An extraordinarily important incident occurred immediately after the news of the coup
reached the camp of the crusaders. Villehardouin wrote, “…those who consented to such a thing
were accomplices in this crime; and over and above all this the Greeks as a people had seceded
from the Church of Rome. ‘We therefore tell you,’ said the clergy, ‘that this war is just and
lawful; and if you fight to conquer this land with the right intention of bringing it under the
authority of Rome, all those of you who die…shall benefit from the indulgence granted by the
Pope.’”226 This incident demonstrates a number of interesting facts about the soldiers within the
crusader army and its attitude regarding attacking fellow Christians on crusade. The fact that
they required reassurance from the clergy that a war against fellow Christians on crusade was
just, and that the Pope’s promise of indulgence still applied, demonstrates that there must have
been a deal of uncertainty in the army if they were engaging in a just war. Villehardouin claims
that the crime of Alexios V’s illegal usurpation was not just to be blamed on the man himself,
but on all who consented in this act, meaning all the Byzantines in the city. Further, he states that
the most important justification was that the Byzantines were heretics.
Surprisingly, when recounting the actual capture and sack of Constantinople,
Villehardouin employed no overtly hostile language and did not present the Byzantines in an
unusually vilified manner. It is only after the capture of the city and the establishment of the
Latin Empire that Villehardouin resumes the familiarly stereotypical language. He wrote that,
“…the Greeks, who were by nature very perfidious, still harbored thoughts of treachery in their
hearts.”227 This is a perfect example of old hostile language still being employed in crusade
narratives. Just as Robert the Monk, Ralph of Caen, Raymond d’Aguilers, Odo of Deuil, and the
anonymous author of the Historia de Expeditione wrote, the Greeks were naturally treacherous
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and could not be trusted to follow any agreements. They were a rebellious people who were
hostile to the crusaders, and only rulership by westerners would correct their erroneous religious
beliefs and force them to join the crusading movement.
Robert de Clari
Robert de Clari was the author of the account La Conquête de Constantinople. Far
removed from the high-level decision making and diplomacy, Robert de Clari provided the
account of a low-ranking knight. Massimiliano Gaggero argues that Clari’s account was
compiled shortly after his return to France in 1205, after the defeat of the crusader forces at the
Battle of Adrianople earlier in the same year.228 If correct, La Conquête de Constantinople would
be one of the closest contemporary accounts of the events of the Fourth Crusade. Gaggero also
argues that Clari may have written his text in order to legitimize his seizure of Byzantine relics,
while also criticizing the perceived poor judgements of the crusade leadership.229 Though his
information may not always be the most accurate, he provides a crucial glimpse into the views
and opinions of the more common soldiers comprising the crusader army.230
Regarding the diversion to Constantinople, he wrote, “The doge of Venice saw right well
that the pilgrims were in sore straits…and said: ‘Lords, in Greece there is a land that is very rich
and plenteous in all good things. If we could have a reasonable excuse for going there and taking
provisions and other things in the land until we were well restored, it would seem to me a good
plan…’ Then the marquis [Boniface] rose and said, ‘Lords, last year at Christmas I was in
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Germany at the court of my lord the emperor. There I saw a youth…son of the Emperor Isaac of
Constantinople, whose brother had taken the empire of Constantinople from him by treason.
Whoever could get hold of this youth…would be well able to go to Constantinople and get
provisions…for this youth is the rightful heir.’”231 According to Clari’s point of view, the
diversion to Constantinople was not accidental. The crusader and Venetian leadership,
understanding that they did not have enough money or supplies to make it to Egypt, the original
target of the campaign, simply calculated that they should go to the Byzantine Empire, and
extract money and supplies, either through force or cooperation. Further, he claims that it was the
crusaders who sent for Alexios IV to join them, not the other way around.232 He deems Alexios
IV’s claim to the Byzantine throne merely an “excuse.” It is important that Clari viewed the
diversion in this manner, as it could be reflective of the opinions of a substantial portion of the
crusade army demonstrated by the frequent desertions and near mutiny.
After capturing Constantinople for the first time, Clari writes that Alexios IV “…dared
not trust himself to his Greeks” and that the Byzantines were “traitors.”233 The language within
the description implies that even the Byzantine emperor, himself, could not trust his own people,
due to their treacherous nature. As a new emperor installed by foreign mercenaries, Alexios IV
was in a tenuous political position. Clearly the city’s populace was not thrilled about their new
emperor, as evidenced by their lack of action in bringing him to the throne.234
Robert de Clari corroborates Geoffrey de Villehardouin’s account regarding the bishops
reassuring the army of their righteousness when hostilities renewed for a second time. According
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to Clari, “Finally, the bishops and clergy of the host consulted together and gave judgement that
the battle was a righteous one and that they were right to attack them. For anciently they of the
city had been obedient to the law of Rome, but now they were disobedient to it, saying that the
law of Rome was worth nothing and that all who believed in it were dogs…on this account they
were right to attack them, and…it was not at all a sin, but a righteous deed.”235 Notably, this
reassurance to the army occurs only when full-blown warfare had broken out, rather than prior to
the initial diversion of the crusade from Egypt to Constantinople. This demonstrates that the
crusade army saw a distinction between the installation of Alexios IV and the war against
Alexios V. The first was an internal war, the second an external conquest. The fact that the army
required such a reassurance at all demonstrates that there was likely doubt among the troops
whether their attack upon fellow Christians during a crusade was sinful or not, and if the
treachery of the Greeks was enough justification for the conflict.
Near the end of Clari’s narrative, he wrote that “…because of [the Greeks’] treason and
disloyalty and the murder that [Alexios V] had done, [God] willed that the city should be taken,
and all the people of the city dishonored.”236 In Clari’s mind, the Byzantines reaped what they
had sown. Their treachery, their support for Alexios V and the murder of Alexios IV, had
incurred the wrath of God, who justly punished them through the crusaders by destroying their
Empire, sacking their city, and humiliating them.

Devastatio Constantinopolitana
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The Devastatio Constantinopolitana is one of the most interesting sources for the Fourth
Crusade. The author of this account is unknown. However, based upon their close familiarity
with specific numbers of ships, troops, and monetary amounts, Alfred Andrea speculates that he
may have been a low-level ecclesiastical administrator involved with financial matters within the
army.237 Whatever his role, it is clear from the language used and the specificity of numbers and
events that he employed that the author of this work was a participant in some fashion in the
Fourth Crusade.
What makes this text so perplexing is the plentitude of factual information, namely that
the text included dates, chronology, and specific numbers of troops, ships, and money, but that it
seemingly lacks a clear purpose. The Devastatio contains no glorification of crusade leaders, and
,in fact, presents a negative attitude towards the Venetians. The author does not dedicate the
work to any ruler or individual and attempts to cover the entirety of the events of the crusade in
an extremely short account.
Notably, the Devastatio contains no grand statements about the natural characteristics of
the Greeks, and overall does not follow the trend in crusade accounts of employing stereotypes
or hostile language regarding the Byzantines. The text does, however, offer some interesting and
subtle passages regarding the perception of Byzantine actions by the crusaders, and considerable
details concerning some events during the crusade.
Among the points of disagreement, the Devastatio directly contradicts Robert de Clari
regarding the diversion to Constantinople. The author wrote, “…a messenger of King Philip238
came…asking the march lord and the barons, that they help his brother-in-law Emperor
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Alexios239 with his difficulty.”240 The account in the Devastatio claims that messengers from
King Philip of Swabia, the reigning King of Germany, requested that the crusade leaders aid
Prince Alexios, not that the crusade leaders sent for the prince, as it is presented in Robert de
Clari’s account. This is an important distinction, as deliberately seeking out a claimant to the
Byzantine throne would indicate premeditation, while Alexios simply appearing after messages
from the King of Germany would indicate spur-of-the-moment action on behalf of the crusaders.
It is interesting to note, however, that the diversion to Constantinople had the backing of the
King of Germany. Naturally, as his brother-in-law, Philip would gain from installing Alexios on
the Byzantine throne, but it is unclear why he asked the crusader army to do this task. Clari
emphasized the poor financial and logistical state of the army, so perhaps Philip was aware of
this and saw an opportunity to use them to his benefit.
When the Byzantine population began to fight with the crusaders after Alexios IV’s
installation, the author wrote, “…the Greeks again were turned in sedition against the Latins
…The Greeks flocked, made an attack…The barons of the Latin army were saddened by this
evil…the multitude of Greeks, crushing the Latins, killed captives without mercy, burned the
dead with fire, and spared neither age nor sex…The pilgrims and Venetians, enduring with
annoyance…attacked the Greeks. The Greeks fled, and the Latins pursued the Greeks all the way
up to the wall, killed many, and took many ships of the Greeks in the port filled with many goods
and supplies.”241 This is one of the only examples of the anonymous author employing hostile
language regarding the Byzantines of the type seen in the works of other crusade authors. He
labels the Byzantine discontent and clashes with the crusade army “sedition” and “evil.” The
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author portrays them barbarically, and accuses them of sparing no one, massacring the
westerners, and refusing to grant them proper burial. Narratively, this passage occurs when
Emperor Alexios IV was venturing out into the provinces with crusader forces attempting to
establish order in the countryside. The crusaders and the Byzantines were not yet at war, and
therefore the anonymous author pins the blame for the beginning of the conflict on the
Byzantines, who acted in “sedition” against them.
The author’s account of the sack of Constantinople is omits a great deal of crucial
information. He wrote, “…we entered into the city; and the greatest slaying of Greeks was done.
Those who could attack us with inconvenient things, we sent fire [to them] and through fire we
repelled them from us. With the coming of night, [Alexios V] fled with a few men. The next day
all the Greeks fell before the infantry of the march lord, and they surrendered themselves and all
their things into his hands. Then, we took the lodgings and the Greeks fled from the city. We
brought all our loot and profit into the city, and we filled three greatest towers with silver. Then
it began to be debated about the choosing of an emperor.”242 The author does not elaborate on the
looting of the city, merely stating how much loot the crusaders took. The author does state that
there was a massive slaughter of the Byzantine population, but makes no comment on the
justification of this massacre. However, it is also important to note that the author did not make
any positive comments or glorify these actions either.
Overall, the author of the Devastatio does not employ the same type of hostile language
utilized by previous crusade authors. Labelling the actions of the Byzantine populace “evil” and
“seditious” are the only examples of the author utilizing hostile language. What the Devastatio
does contain, however, is a brief but pessimistic account of the Fourth Crusade, with interesting
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details which contradict other accounts, such as Philip of Swabia’s explicit backing of Alexios
IV. Further, the overall narrative structure of the Devastatio is important, as it demonstrates a
complete lack of pride in the accomplishments of the crusade and notes the futility of the
enterprise, as the rich simply acquired more riches while they paid the poorer soldiers meager
scraps.
Niketas Choniates
Niketas Choniates, as previously mentioned on page [INSERT PAGE NUMBER], was a
Byzantine imperial bureaucrat, governor, and author who wrote the Historia covering the reigns
of Emperors John II Komnenos (r.1118-1143), Manuel I Komnenos (r.1143-1180), Alexios II
Komnenos (r.1180-1183, Andronikos I Komnenos (r.1183-1185), Isaac II Angelos (r.11851195), Alexios III Angelos (r.1195-1203), and the brief reigns of Alexios IV Angelos (r.12031204) and Alexios V (r.1204). This huge history, covering the period between 1118-1204,
continues the Byzantine historiographical tradition of utilizing hostile language concerning
western Europeans. It is important to note that Niketas composed the Historia after the sack of
Constantinople, to which he was an eyewitness, and understandably wrote about the actions of
the crusaders during the Fourth Crusade with great rage and hatred.
When beginning his discussion of the Fourth Crusade, Niketas laments “What judgement
is reasonable for him who must relate in detail the common calamities which this queen of
cities243 endured during the reign of the [Angeloi]? I would that I might worthily and fully
recount the most oppressive and grievous of all evils. But, since this is impossible, I shall
abbreviate the narration...thereby mitigating excessive grief."244 This demonstrates that Niketas
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harbored extraordinarily negative feelings about the destruction of his beloved city of
Constantinople and that this grief was still very much fresh in his mind. These views certainly
distorted Niketas’ perceptions of the crusaders and their actions, but it is important to understand
that this rage generated by the sack would lead to centuries of hostility against the Latins in the
Byzantine Empire. This does not mean that they did not engage in diplomacy with western
nations or refuse to employ western mercenaries. What it did mean, however, was that a large
section of Byzantine society refused to accept any religious compromise with or support from the
western nations during the period of Ottoman conquests. Therefore, Niketas was not alone in
harboring a grudge against the Latins for this monumental event.
Regarding the Doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, and the origins of the Fourth Crusade,
Niketas wrote that, “The doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, was not the least of horrors…a
creature most treacherous and extremely jealous of the Romans, a sly cheat who called himself
wiser than the wise and madly thirsting after glory as no other…realizing that he should work
some treachery against the Romans…he schemed to include other accomplices…those whom he
knew nursed an implacable hatred against the Romans and who looked with an envious and
avaricious eye on their goods.”245 Niketas denounces Dandolo as a treacherous and jealous
“creature” who hated the Byzantines. Importantly, Niketas does not attribute this hatred to a
personal grudge, but to the anti-Venetian policies of the previous emperors Isaac II and Alexios
III Angelos – their “insulting treatment” of Venice, as he puts it.246 Niketas also continues the
Byzantine practice of labelling western peoples “hostile to the Romans” and emphasizes their
greed and envy, traits which the Byzantines associated with the “Latin barbarian.”
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Niketas portrays Alexios IV as a misled youth, writing that “…evil was heaped upon
evil…for Alexios [IV]…was supplied with letters from the pope…and Philip, King of Germany,
that pledged their profound gratitude to these piratical gangs if they would welcome Alexios and
restore him to his paternal throne… [Alexios’] presence… provid[ed] not only an opportune
camouflage for sailing out to plunder the Romans but also a specious reason for sating the
Venetians’ avaricious and money-loving temperament…they were all cunning in their ways and
troublemakers, and they laid hold of Alexios, who was [a] juvenile…and prevailed upon him to
agree under oath to demands which were impossible to fulfill…what was even worse and most
reprehensible, he abjured his faith and embraced that of the Latins…”247 Niketas correctly asserts
that Alexios IV had the backing of his brother in law, Philip of Swabia, but is incorrect in his
belief that Pope Innocent III supported the diversion to Constantinople. In fact, the pope
specifically forbade the crusade army from attacking the Byzantines, but the leadership
concealed this information from the army.248 Niketas labels the crusade army “piratical gangs”
who sought a convenient excuse to loot Byzantine lands to satiate their greed. He also portrays
the crusade leaders as criminals who manipulated Alexios IV into accepting terms which Niketas
knew were impossible to meet. Finally, Niketas takes an opportunity to condemn the heresy of
the Latins and is horrified at Alexios’ promise to convert the Empire to Catholicism.
Niketas says little concerning the first capture of Constantinople worthy of note, except
that he utterly condemned Emperor Alexios III for his incompetence in fighting the crusaders
and laments the first burning of the city. When the city was captured for the first time, however,
Niketas writes that, “[The crusaders] made no changes in their expectations of the city…These
were…that none of the extravagant pledges to provide the Latins with glory and gain was to be
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held back…Alexios, a witless lad ignorant of affairs of state, neither comprehended any of the
issues at stake nor reflected for a moment on the Roman-hating temperament of the Latins…no
nation loves money more than this race…”249 Niketas once again continues the idea that the
westerners were greedy “Roman-haters,” and that Alexios IV was a totally disconnected prince
who governed incompetently. He later blames the greed of the crusaders for the melting of
precious church icons, a desperate action taken by Isaac II and Alexios IV to pay the crusaders
the funds which had been promised to them.
When the crusaders attempted to loot a mosque in Constantinople during the interval
between the first and second capture of the city, Niketas labels the crusaders an “evil battalion”
and their actions “outrages.”250 It is a fascinating detail in the text that Niketas frames the
crusaders as “evil” and the Muslims as righteously defending themselves, putting the actions of
the crusaders below those of the Muslims and praising the Byzantines in the city who came to
the mosque’s defense.251 He attributes the second burning of the city to the crusaders after this
incident, who acted in retaliation for the populace’s defense of the mosque.
Regarding the character of the newly crowned Emperor Alexios IV, Niketas wrote that
“…[he] committed many more outrageous offenses and sullied the majestic, all-glorious name of
the Roman Empire…he crossed over to the tents of the barbarians, where he engaged in drinking
bouts and…playing dice…Alexios [was] deemed an abomination by sensible Romans for
passing his time with the Latin nobles in such activities…”252 There is a fascinating idea
presented here, that Alexios had become Latinized. Unaware of the customs and court practices
of Byzantine emperors, Alexios continued acting like he had before becoming emperor, playing
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games with the crusade leaders, and fooling around. According to Niketas, these actions
transformed Alexios from an unaware child, as he presented him beforehand, into an
“abomination.” He later wrote that Alexios initially refused to fight the crusaders, as he found it
“unnatural” to fight the men who installed him upon his throne.253
Niketas frames the overthrow of Alexios IV not necessarily as a palace coup, but as a
general uprising of the population of Constantinople, writing that the people were dissatisfied
with the lack of action against the crusaders by the reigning emperors. There was a great
gathering at the Hagia Sophia, where the populace attempted to find a nobleman to crown as a
new emperor. When Alexios IV heard of this gathering, he resolved to bring crusader troops into
the city to quell the revolt. Unable to bear such a betrayal, the general Alexios V launched a
palace coup against Alexios IV, imprisoning and later strangling him before his own acclamation
as emperor.254 The most important aspect of this passage is that Niketas portrays Isaac II and
Alexios III as out of step with the beliefs of the city’s population. The latter wished to fight the
crusaders and viewed them as enemies, while Alexios saw them as his only source of power.
The new emperor, Alexios V, finally initiated action against the crusaders, repelling
assaults on the city walls and riding out to meet crusader forces in combat. Though he suffered
important defeats, including the loss of the Hodegetria,255 Niketas notes that the Byzantine
populace appreciated his action. When Alexios V met with Doge Enrico Dandolo for peace
negotiations, Niketas claims that the crusaders demanded five thousand pounds of gold and
“certain other conditions which were both galling and unacceptable to those who have tasted
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freedom and are accustomed to give, not take, commands.”256 Once again, these demands were
wholly unrealistic, likely deliberately so, as the crusaders had already drawn up plans for the
division of the Empire and the distribution of loot. Niketas frames their demands as essentially
worthy of slaves and subjects, not free people, harkening back to old ancient Athenian ideas
regarding freedom and slavery.257
After the crusaders defeated Byzantine attempts to break the siege, the morale of the
Byzantine defenders collapsed, and Alexios V fled in the night. The Byzantine Senate and
assembly of people proclaimed a new emperor, but he too fled in the night.258 With no other
options available, the city surrendered to the crusaders, and they began to sack the city. Niketas
emphasizes the horrors and atrocities committed by the crusaders during the sack, including the
destruction of ancient Greek, Roman, and Byzantine art, the desecration of churches, and the
mass slaughter and rape throughout the city.259 He labels the crusaders “…forerunners of the
Antichrist, chief agents and harbingers of his anticipated ungodly deeds…the most wicked and
impious deeds were perpetrated by all with one accord…above all, it was difficult…to mollify
the barbarians with entreaties…as they were highly irascible and bilious and unwilling to listen
to anything. Everything incited their anger…”260 Niketas condemns the crusaders as agents of the
Antichrist, committing acts of indescribable evil. He notes that they rarely extended mercy to the
Byzantines unless they complied with every request they made and surrendered all of their
wealth and possessions.
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The author provides an account of his personal experience during the sack of
Constantinople, writing that he was in the city on the first day of the sack and sought shelter in
his Venetian friend’s house. When the crusaders began demanding to search the house, Niketas
and his family joined a large mass of Byzantine refugees leaving the city. They covered
themselves in mud to make themselves less attractive targets, and the women marched in the
center of the column to prevent the crusaders from easily seizing them. Despite this, a western
soldier seized a woman, and Niketas personally begged other soldiers to force him to release the
woman, which the soldier relented to after many threats.261 Niketas condemns the “…beef-eating
Latins…[who] pour out their wine both unmixed and pure in the same way that they pour out
their unmitigated gall, and they treat the Romans with arrogance and contempt.”262 He connects
the western practice of drinking unmixed wine with their audacity and notes their contempt
towards the Byzantines.
Niketas summarizes his thoughts about the crusades shortly afterwards. He writes, “Even
more culpable were those who had raised the cross to their shoulders, who had time and again
sworn by it and the sayings of the Lord to cross over Christian lands without bloodletting…and
to take up arms against the Saracens…in truth, they were exposed as frauds…they raged openly
against Christ and sinned by overturning the Cross with the cross they bore on their backs, not
even shuddering to trample on it for the sake of a little gold and silver. By grasping pearls, they
rejected Christ…”263 Niketas condemns the hypocrisy of the crusaders, who swore to fight the
enemies of Christianity and instead committed unheard-of atrocities against fellow Christians.
He notes that even the Muslims did not commit such acts when they recaptured Jerusalem, even
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though the crusaders acted with extreme brutality when they captured Jerusalem initially. This is
the culmination of Latin greed, in the Byzantine mindset – the brutal barbarians were willing to
commit any sacrilege or atrocity to enrich themselves.
Niketas also blamed the rulers of the Angeloi dynasty, specifically Isaac II and Alexios
III Angelos, for poorly administering the Byzantine Empire during the preceding decades. He
wrote, “The Angelos brothers were guilty of poor administration of state affairs…particularly
obsessed with the love of money, they…taxed the members of the Latin nation in their midst.
Often disregarding treaties made with the Venetians, they mulcted them of monies, levied taxes
on their ships…”264 Niketas possessed a surprising amount of perspective and did not simply
place all the blame upon the Latins, or on the sins of the Byzantine people, or any other moral
reason, as one might expect from a historian of the time. Though he does include some of these
reasons as well, Niketas specifically blamed the fiscal policies of the Angeloi emperors
stretching back twenty years, understanding that government policy had an effect upon
Byzantine-Venetian relations and government finances. He also blames Emperor Alexios III for
ignoring reports on the actions and movements of the crusade army, including during period
around the sack of Zara.265

Chapter Three: Comparative Analysis and Role in Historiography
There is a multitude of evidence that both crusade authors and Byzantine authors
employed the use of hostile language and stereotypes about each other extensively in their
writings. However, what is remarkable is the level of continuity throughout over a century of
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writings regarding both stereotypes and larger narrative themes. Among western authors, the
stereotypes utilized can be categorized under the rubrics of deceit, heresy, cowardice, and
effeminacy. The common stereotypes employed by Byzantine authors were deceit, greed, rage,
and stupidity. All these hostile sentiments were present in the works of all the authors who wrote
during the period between 1096 to 1204. However, the evidence suggests that continued
interactions throughout the crusading period influenced western perceptions of Byzantium and
Byzantine perceptions of the west, and that these interactions constantly changed and shifted
hostile stereotypes and their expression in narrative works. The addition and emphasis of new
stereotypes in later works, particularly heresy, were certainly the result of closer contact and
interaction between the crusaders and the Byzantine Empire.

Western
Deceit
The stereotype most emphasized and frequently mentioned in western texts regarding the
Byzantines is their proclivity for deceit, plots, and intrigue. The secretive and backstabbing
nature of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos in particular plays a key role in narratives of the works
of Robert the Monk, Ralph of Caen, Fulcher of Chartres, and Raymond d’Aguilers. According to
these authors, all of the actions taken by Alexios and the Byzantines were simply plots and
schemes to ensure that the crusade would fail. The bandits who raided crusader camps and
supply lines were allegedly agents of Alexios, acting upon his personal orders. The oath to return
Byzantine lands, which the crusade leaders swore to the emperor, was illegitimate and forced
upon the leaders after Alexios treacherously imprisoned them by luring them to the capital with
promises of riches. The capture of Nicaea is presented as a betrayal of the crusade and an
example of Byzantine treachery, as the city surrendered specifically to the Byzantines and
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Alexios did not allow the crusaders to loot the city, despite the fact that no such promise of
looting appears to have been part of the oath the leaders swore to Alexios.
The most important episode of Byzantine “treachery” in these works, however, is the
departure of the Byzantine contingent during the siege of Antioch and the failure of Alexios to
ride to the aid of the crusaders during this harrowing siege. The western authors present the lack
of Byzantine participation in the siege of Antioch as a direct betrayal of the terms of the oath,
namely that Alexios would mobilize all of his available forces to assist the crusader army. These
authors present the emperor’s refusal to send a large army as a perfect example of the treachery
of the Byzantines. Fulcher of Chartres and Ralph of Caen omit mention of Tatikios or the
Byzantine contingent during the beginning phase of the siege entirely, in order to reinforce their
narratives of Byzantine deceit and betrayal. Robert the Monk and Raymond d’Aguilers include
reference to the contingent but claim that its withdrawal was due to a Byzantine plot to destroy
the crusade.
Another crucial aspect which led to the development of the deceit stereotype throughout
accounts of the First Crusade was the discontinuity between western expectations for the
Byzantines’ attitudes towards them and the reality of their actions. Multiple authors write that
they expected the Byzantines to welcome them with open arms and hail them as heroes marching
to their salvation.266 Historian Gregory Bell wrote that “The crusaders had expected Alexios to
be kind and offer provisions, and the fact that this did not always happen…led chroniclers to
label their hosts as fraudulent, cunning, and treacherous.”267 Bell argues that the shattering of the
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image of the helpless, begging eastern Christian in western eyes was the real cause for the
development of anti-Byzantine stereotypes in the west. Far from the desperate Christians that
Pope Urban II portrayed in his famous Council of Clermont speech, the Byzantines received the
crusaders with wary suspicion, thus creating, in Bell’s view, the anti-Byzantine stereotypes
which spread throughout western Europe. The Byzantine sources admit that Emperor Alexios
and the Byzantines received the crusaders with extreme caution and distrust. The actions of
Alexios clearly reflect a fear that the crusaders could fight against the Empire in some way, and
that the whole idea of the crusade was a facade. The participation of Bohemond d’Hauteville, a
lifelong enemy of the Byzantine Empire, certainly increased Byzantine suspicion of the goals
and motives of the crusade.
It is, however, important to note that the First Crusade authors primarily focused on the
deceitful character of Emperor Alexios himself, instead of accusing the Byzantines in general of
being backstabbers. The authors assume all Byzantine actions during the crusade were
undertaken as a result of direct orders from Alexios himself.268 Some historians, such as Savvas
Neocleous, argue that First Crusade histories were not even anti-Byzantine, but exclusively antiAlexios.269 However, one of the key developments of later crusade literature, particularly from
the Second Crusade onwards, was the shift from condemning the character of the emperors to
lambasting the Byzantines as a people. The later writers presented the Greeks as a whole as
possessing these deficient character traits, and the emperors as reflecting these ethnic
characteristics, as opposed to the emperor’s character alone being immoral.
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In Odo of Deuil’s work, the treachery of the Byzantines is centerstage, as he claims that
the Byzantines raided the crusader camps en route, defrauded them at markets, and informed the
Turks and other Muslims of the crusaders’ locations and numbers. Throughout the entirety of the
De Profectione, Odo claims that the Byzantines and their emperor Manuel I plotted against the
crusade and sought its downfall at every turn. He ties these actions to the Byzantine idea of the
sacred empire, claiming that they would do anything and commit any crime, including lying, if it
was to the benefit of the empire.270 Importantly, Odo was the first crusade author to focus on
both the deceitful character of the reigning emperor, Manuel I, and also the deceitful character of
the Byzantine people as a whole.
Forty years later, the anonymous author of the Historia De Expeditione Frederici
Imperatoris labeled the Byzantines as deceitful and wicked for their actions during the Third
Crusade. He portrays Isaac II and the Byzantines as hostile to the crusade, and compares their
actions to the deceitfulness of snakes, evoking biblical imagery of the devil.271 As the crusaders
expected from the Byzantines based upon the reading of previous crusade sources, the emperor
refused to uphold agreements with the German emperor until compelled through force of arms.
The interactions between the Germans and the Byzantines during the Third Crusade set an
example for the westerners, that military threats and conflict were the only tools to force the
deceitful Byzantines to uphold any agreements they made. Historian Gregory Bell wrote that,
“Over time, Europeans came to expect Byzantine support on crusade, and felt that force might be
used if the Byzantine emperor failed to assist in the crusaders’ cause…it is strikingly similar in
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nature to the crusaders’ anger at not receiving the emperor’s military aid during the First
Crusade.”272 Henry VI of Germany in 1194273 and the crusaders during the Fourth Crusade
employed both the threat of invasion and combat to extract favorable terms in agreements with
the Byzantines.
Finally, in the Fourth Crusade sources, both Villehardouin and Clari portray the
Byzantines as wily and deceitful men who could not be trusted to uphold agreements or even
loyally serve western lords. They described Alexios IV, the claimant whom the crusaders
installed upon the Byzantine throne, as a formerly young, noble prince who had become
corrupted by the deceitful nature of his subjects, “Byzantinizing” into a backstabbing traitor like
the emperors before him. There was no recognition in the western sources that the Byzantines
could not meet the terms of Alexios’ initial agreement with the crusaders. Instead, they frame
Alexios and the Byzantines as betraying the agreement simply because betrayal was a natural
Byzantine characteristic.
It is no surprise, therefore, that there was widespread distrust of the Byzantines by the
westerners. Stereotypes of Byzantine deceit abounded in crusade histories throughout accounts in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and changed extraordinarily little over time. The authors
always presented Byzantine emperors as deceitful plotters, who sought to harm the crusade in
through informing their enemies, raiding their camps, and defrauding them. It was only logical
that the leaders of the Fourth Crusade took the opportunity to “Catholicize” the Byzantine
Empire and install an unabashedly pro-crusade emperor. Through installing Alexios IV, the
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crusaders could finally rid the crusading enterprise of one of its greatest perceived thorns in its
side: the treacherous Byzantines.
Cowardice and Effeminacy
Another remarkably consistent stereotype present in western crusade literature is the
sentiment that the Byzantines were effeminate cowards. Modern historians particularly
emphasized this stereotype in works investigating the Fourth Crusade.274 Cowardice and
effeminacy are noticeably less present and less mentioned than deceit in crusade era primary
sources, but the idea itself plays a crucial role in the authors’ justifications for the crusaders’
actions, such as refusing to return former Byzantine lands to the Byzantines.
The idea of Greek effeminacy and cowardice is mentioned during the First Crusade,
particularly by the most hostile authors, Robert the Monk and Ralph of Caen. Both authors
emphasize the cowardice and unmanliness of the Byzantines, and mock how their troops fled
before them in skirmishes. These authors also present the justification for keeping former
Byzantine lands under their own rule instead of returning them, as stipulated in their oaths to the
emperor. They argue that the Byzantines lost their right to govern these lands after they lost them
to the Turks. The Byzantines were unworthy and simply too cowardly to rule over lands of such
importance as Antioch, Jerusalem, and the Levant. Instead, the chosen people of God, being the
Franks, were the only ones capable of holding and defending these crucial holy sites. Peter
Edbury and John Rowe write that William of Tyre, a Latin chronicler from the Kingdom of
Jerusalem, also included these justifications for the establishment of the crusader states, though
they note that William was almost certainly relying upon the accounts of famous First Crusade
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sources, such as Robert the Monk and the Gesta Francorum.275 Conor Kostick identifies the
withdrawal of Tatikios from the Siege of Antioch during the First Crusade as a key moment in
the development of the stereotype of Byzantine cowardice among westerners.276 During the
Second Crusade, Odo of Deuil also furthers these views. He lambasts the Byzantines for
“degenerating” into women for promising to give the crusaders everything they wanted, only to
stab them in the back through scamming them in the markets and informing the Turks of their
movements.
Authors who discussed the Third and Fourth Crusades do not specifically label the
Byzantines effeminate. However, they do emphasize the cowardice of the Byzantines, a trait
often linked to femininity. The author of the Historia De Expeditione mocks the Byzantine
attempts to halt the crusade army as pathetic actions to stop the inevitable march of the German
emperor. The Germans won victory after victory against them, raiding Thrace and the northern
Balkans and seizing key cities in the region. Eventually, the Byzantine Emperor Isaac II had no
other options left but to make peace with them and give in to their demands. The Byzantine
defeat solidified the western perception of cowardice, and they would continue to militarily
threaten the empire in subsequent decades.
The cowardice of the Byzantines plays a central theme in the works of the Fourth
Crusade writers. The defeat of the Byzantines repeatedly in battle, and the shocking loss of
Constantinople itself, demonstrated to the crusaders that the Byzantines were unworthy to rule
such a city. Byzantine troops often barely put up a fight before fleeing in the face of the
crusaders’ advance. The starkest example, mentioned by both Robert de Clari and Geoffrey de
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Villehardouin, was the last-ditch attempt by Alexios III to intimidate the crusaders. He marched
out of the Theodosian Walls with all the forces he could gather, and the western authors note that
they hugely outnumbered their own forces. However, instead of engaging in battle, Alexios
retreated into the city and fled during the night, abandoning his post. This blatant display of
cowardice was, in the eyes of the western authors, the culmination of Byzantine cowardice. The
mere sight of the crusader forces loosely arrayed was enough to provoke Alexios into
abandoning his capital during the night.
Some historians, such as John France, argue that there were no longstanding ethnic
stereotypes against the Byzantines among the nations of the west. Instead, France argues that one
anti-Byzantine First Crusade source, the Gesta Francorum, was responsible for spreading these
sentiments in other literary sources, and that these stereotypes were not popularly held beliefs.277
Notably, the stereotype of Greek cowardice did not originate during the crusades. Luigi Berto
convincingly argues through an in-depth analysis of pre-crusade Italian sources that histories
contained anti-Byzantine stereotypes for centuries before the crusades, including the idea that the
Byzantines were naturally cowards, were effeminate, and did not know how to properly fight.278
Importantly, these stereotypes were widespread among the Italo-Normans, a group which fought
the Byzantine Empire for control of Southern Italy for decades. Therefore, there was
longstanding hostility between the Byzantines and Normans which their interactions during the
crusades only exacerbated.
Heresy
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The most important hostile stereotype to develop from the Second, Third, and Fourth
Crusades was the accusation of heresy against the Byzantine people. Traditionally, historians
viewed the Great Schism of 1054 as a clear break between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches,
the moment when they became irrevocably separated.279 However, the primary sources of the
First Crusade from the western perspective contain little evidence to suggest that the authors
thought the Byzantines were evil heretics. The crusade authors clearly had no love for the
Byzantines or their emperors, writing scathing accounts of their deceit and backstabbing. Why,
then, do they not also accuse them of heresy? One explanation for the lack of religious disputes
during the expedition itself is that one of the expressed goals of the First Crusade was to help the
Byzantines against the Turks.
The initial goal of the crusade, however, does not explain why the western authors did
not accuse the Byzantines of heresy in the aftermath of the First Crusade, when a rift in relations
had already occurred. The idea that the Byzantines were filthy heretics had not yet become
widespread among western Europeans in the early twelfth century. Perhaps the authors thought
that mentioning the intricate theological differences and the rejection of papal authority would
ring hollow, given the ongoing Investiture Controversy, a series of disputes between secular
rulers and the papacy over the right to nominate bishops.280 Many kings rejected the papacy’s
authority to nominate bishops and overrule the wishes of the kings
As previously mentioned, there are no examples of accusations of heresy within the First
Crusade primary sources from the west. The first author to directly accuse the Byzantines of
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heresy was the Second Crusade writer, Odo of Deuil, who argued that the Franks should kill the
Byzantines for their false beliefs. He specifically accuses the Byzantines of washing and
purifying altars which Catholics had previously used, rebaptizing converts from Catholicism to
Orthodoxy, and rejecting papal authority. As a priest, Odo held stronger theological views than
the average crusade soldier. However, Odo’s inclusion of the charge of heresy is especially
important, as it represents the first mention of Byzantine heresy in a crusade history.
In the primary Third Crusade narrative, the Historia De Expeditione, the author mentions
heresy, but barely as an afterthought. He wrote simply that the Byzantines held incorrect views
on the Trinity, believing that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son and the Father, and
that they rejected the authority of the pope. The author placed this passage at the end of his
section on German-Byzantine interactions, indicating that he did not view these differences as a
key point of tension and conflict between the crusaders and the Byzantines.
By the time the Fourth Crusade authors wrote their accounts, it was well known among
westerners that the Byzantines held differing religious beliefs. No Fourth Crusade author
included a detailed history of East-West church interactions or differing theological beliefs when
explaining the terms Alexios IV agreed to when the leaders diverted the crusade. Rather, they all
assumed that the readers would know that the Byzantine religious practices were considerably
different from those of the Catholic church.
Interestingly, both Robert de Clari and Villehardouin mention an incident during the
outbreak of hostilities between the Byzantines and crusaders. To rally the soldiers and raise their
morale, both sources claim that clergy members encouraged them by stating that the Byzantines
were heretics and that God and the church viewed the war as justified. It is extremely important
to note that this event only occurred after the beginning of war. It was a method of boosting the
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morale of the crusaders daunted by Constantinople’s high walls, and not a primary justification
for the diversion of the crusade itself.
The stipulation that Alexios IV personally convert himself and the Empire to Catholicism
indicates that the Orthodoxy of the Byzantines was a primary concern to the leaders of the
crusade which they sought to “remedy.” Despite the pope’s denunciations of this justification for
diversion,281 it remained a key demand from the crusaders, and the realization that the
Byzantines would never accept Catholicism only increased their desire to rule the land
themselves.

Narrative Themes
Overall, the authors of crusade narratives throughout the period of 1096-1204 present the
Byzantines as enemies of the crusades, an annoying roadblock at best and villains in the story
similar to the Muslims at worst. In First Crusade histories, authors present crusader interactions
with Byzantines as another trial from God on their holy quest. The Byzantine emperor Alexios I
attempted to trick them, weaken them, and plotted their demise, while the crusade leaders
endured and outsmarted him. It is notable that, for most First Crusade histories, interactions with
the Byzantines comprise about half of the entire story.
In Second Crusade histories, the Byzantine Empire becomes more than merely a
roadblock. Odo of Deuil directly blames the Byzantines for the failure of the crusade and their
defeat in battle against the Turks, claiming that Emperor Manuel I gave them traitorous guides,
attacked them, and informed the enemy of their movements. The Byzantine Empire is the
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primary villain in the story, and Odo barely mentions the Turks or Muslims. Odo wrote the De
Profectione while the crusade was still ongoing, ending the narrative when the French army
arrived in Antioch, and deliberately stated that the purpose of the text was to teach future
crusaders the perils of interaction with the Byzantines and call for revenge against them.
Third Crusade histories are quite different, as the German emperor subdued the
Byzantines in war and forced them to agree to his stipulations. The anonymous author of the
Historia De Expeditione presents the Byzantines and Emperor Isaac II as traitorous cowards,
who opposed the passage of the crusaders due to their own treachery and paranoia. Further, he
lambasts them as allies of Saladin, the grave enemy of the Third Crusade, directly equating the
Byzantines with the Muslims.
Authors of the Fourth Crusade present the Byzantines in many similar ways thematically.
Because the crusade never even reached the Holy Land, crusader interactions with the
Byzantines comprise the majority of the narrative. Even though the crusaders installed Alexios
IV and were ostensibly allied with him and the Empire, they still portray the Byzantine people,
especially the inhabitants of Constantinople, as the primary villains of the narrative. They are
treacherous, corrupted the formerly honorable Alexios IV, and opposed the crusaders at every
opportunity.
Therefore, there is clear continuity between crusade histories of the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Crusades. All the histories contain either similar hostile language, stereotypes, or
themes which portray the Byzantines as enemies. Naturally, these themes and perceptions
changed over time due to the repeated interactions of the crusaders and Byzantines, as the
development of the heresy stereotype demonstrates, but the western depictions of Byzantine
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treachery, deceit, and effeminacy, along with the Byzantine depictions of western barbarism,
unfaithfulness, and greed, all remained remarkably similar over time.

Byzantine
Greed
In Byzantine sources, there is remarkable consistency regarding the characterization of
the Latins. The conception of the Latin barbarian came with a set of natural character traits, and
the one Byzantine authors mention the most is greed. According to Anna Komnene, John
Kinnamos, and Niketas Choniates, writing over a period of one century, the lust for money
dominated the actions of the Latin barbarian.
In the First Crusade, Anna believed that the crusaders kept the Holy Land for themselves
and reneged on their oath simply due to their greed. They saw the wealth and power of the lands
and decided to keep them for themselves. Furthermore, Alexios heaped mountains of gold upon
the crusade leaders, as was customary in Byzantine diplomacy, yet they had extraordinarily little
gratitude for this crucial financial support. They kept the money and always wanted more.
Alexios paying the crusaders for recapturing Nicaea was not enough for these barbarians. They
wanted to sack a prominent Byzantine city, despite already receiving payment from Emperor
Alexios himself. Writing after the fact, Anna looked back with disdain upon the crusaders and
their supposed motives, writing that the entire campaign was all a façade to enrich themselves in
coin and land.
Kinnamos presents the same beliefs in his writings on the Second Crusade, comparing the
creation of the Principality of Antioch during the First Crusade to robbery and the crusaders to
thieves. In attempting to reestablish authority over the crusader states, the Byzantines were
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simply punishing a crime and correcting their behavior. Kinnamos also attributes the raiding of
the German and French armies to their greed, writing that they were never satisfied with the
offerings of the local population, but instead took what they wanted by force.
Writing on the Third and Fourth Crusades, Niketas provides a more interesting
perspective. Despite participating in the administration of Isaac II during the Third Crusade,
Niketas presents a sympathetic narrative to Frederick Barbarossa, honoring his “apostolic” virtue
and admitting that he was honest in his requests from the Byzantines. He did write that the greed
for money dominated and drove the actions of the Germans as a whole, and all “barbarians.” In
Niketas’ narrative, the greed for Byzantine wealth and lands was the primary motivation for the
crusaders.
Niketas continues to express similar ideas in his account of the Fourth Crusade, as he
refers to the crusaders as pirates and claims the purpose of the expedition was simply to enrich
Venice and the leaders of the crusade. Their greed insatiable, the crusaders would accept no
Byzantine peace offer and no amount of tribute that did not meet their impossible expectations.
During the sack of Constantinople itself, the crusaders searched every house and intimidated
every person they saw to squeeze as much wealth from the city as possible.
Deceit
The Byzantine authors also routinely depict the crusaders as deceitful. During the First
Crusade, the chief origin of this stereotype was the betrayal of the oath sworn to Alexios. The
leaders of the crusade specifically promised to return all former Byzantine lands, yet they kept
the entire Levant under their rule. One of the leaders, Bohemond, even organized an expedition
against the crusaders less than a decade after the end of the First Crusade. Further, all Byzantine
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authors viewed their claimed desires to liberate the Holy Land simply as a ruse, from this
crusade onwards.
In the Second Crusade, Kinnamos wrote that their explanations for the crusade were all
lies, and that the true motive for the expedition was the destruction of the Byzantine Empire. The
French and Germans used the Holy Land justification as an excuse to pillage Byzantine lands
and steal their wealth. This claim matches exactly with those presented in the Alexiad and the
Historia of Niketas.
Likewise, Niketas explicitly states that the crusaders and their justifications were
fraudulent. The result of the Fourth Crusade demonstrated, in his view, that the previous
Byzantine authors were correct. All crusades were ruses with the hidden goal of sacking the
largest and wealthiest city in Europe, Constantinople, and the plight of Christians in the Holy
Land was forgotten. Niketas believed that the crusaders deliberately misrepresented their
ambitions in order to trick unsuspecting Christians into joining their army and helping their
cause, all the while the backstabbing crusade leaders manipulated the army to further their own
territorial ambitions in Byzantine territory.
Rage and Stupidity
The final main character trait of the “Latin barbarian” was rage and stupidity. Naturally,
as barbarians, they thought that the westerners did not have the intellectual capacity that the
Byzantines possessed. Anna portrays the crusaders, especially the leaders, as “barbarian lunatics”
whose hatred against the Empire drove them to loot and steal their rightful lands.
Kinnamos likewise characterizes Conrad III of Germany as a raging barbarian during the
Second Crusade. Kinnamos contrasts the rage filled, disorganized fighting style of the Germans
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to the “scientific” fighting of the Byzantines.282 Conrad raged through Byzantine lands until,
according to Kinnamos, he saw the impregnable Theodosian Walls, whereupon he realized that
he was not strong enough to force an entry into the city. He also contrasts Conrad’s mental
weakness with Manuel’s intelligence, noting how Manuel bribed his vassals to further humiliate
the “barbarian.”
Writing about both the Third and Fourth Crusades, Niketas explicitly states that the
Latins harbored an undying hatred of the Byzantines. He attributes this hatred to their jealousy,
their greed, and their rage. He did, however, unlike previous Byzantine authors, differentiate the
Venetians from the rest of the crusaders. He admits that the Venetians possessed a cunning
intelligence, and claims they used the crusaders merely as their pawns to achieve their financial
and geopolitical goals. He presents the rest of the crusaders, however, as dumb brutes whose rage
could not be appeased through any means.
Narrative Themes
Narratively, the Byzantine authors present the crusades as an excuse to raid Byzantine
lands and steal their wealth. No Byzantine author accepts their reasoning for going on crusade as
true, and most label them liars and tricksters. All the Byzantine works did not exclusively focus
on the Byzantines and the crusades, however. Rather, each work examined the reign of one or
multiple emperors and the sum of their accomplishments or failures. Therefore, in this context,
the authors present the crusaders as merely another challenge to the power of the Empire and the
emperors, a challenge which Alexios and Manuel were able to skillfully overcome, and a threat
to which Isaac II and Alexios III failed to subdue. The Byzantines depict them as barbarians

282

The Deeds of John and Manuel Komnenos. 67

101

similar to the Turks, the Pechenegs, or even the ancient Persians. In their mind, the crusaders
were nothing more than another wave of barbarian invaders.

Norman Propaganda
Another aspect of these texts which requires mention is the role of Norman propaganda.
Certain stereotypes, especially heresy, did not develop organically, but through the explicit
backing of the Norman lords of Sicily. The Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen is the most direct
example of Norman propaganda, because this work was explicitly created to glorify Tancred
d’Hauteville, nephew of Bohemond, and to defame the Byzantines. Translator Carol
Sweetenham speculates that Robert the Monk completed his work, a revision of the Gesta
Francorum, on behalf of a Norman propaganda effort in the years following the First Crusade,
when Bohemond was travelling through western and southern Europe seeking to rally support
for an expedition against the Byzantines. It is less clear that this propaganda campaign
influenced the other hostile works of the First Crusade, the histories of Fulcher of Chartres and
Raymond d’Aguilers. Odo of Deuil specifically mentions that Normans appeared at the French
council before the Second Crusade to condemn the Byzantines as deceitful plotters who would
undermine the crusade. By the time of the Third Crusade, the German emperors had established
their rule over the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, and they no longer played a role in Byzantinecrusader relations. However, their legacy of poisoned Byzantine-crusader relations lived on.

Imperial Propaganda
Likewise, the Byzantine imperial government deliberately sought to exalt the reigning
emperor and his ancestors and to defame his enemies. Though not directly sponsored by the
imperial government, Anna Komnene wrote the Alexiad with the purpose of defending the
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conduct of her father, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, and vilifying his enemies. Kinnamos’
History did not have direct imperial backing, but he too exalted the deeds of the emperors he
served under, John II and Manuel I. The sponsorship of Niketas’ Historia is less certain, as he
bucks the trend of previous Byzantine writers and openly criticizes the emperors, including ones
he served under. Harry Magoulias argues that Niketas completed the final part of the work in
1206 in Constantinople, a year before he fled to the Empire of Nicaea, and therefore he could not
have received government backing for the final portion of the work.283

Intertextuality
An important aspect one must consider when examining narrative sources written over
the course of one century is intertextuality, the relationship between different texts and authors.
John France states that the Gesta Francorum, and its subsequent revision, Robert the Monk’s
Historia Hierosolymitana, became the most popular First Crusade narrative account, spreading
widely across France, receiving sponsorship from the Normans and the French monarchy for
propaganda purposes.284 France claims that most subsequent authors of First Crusade narratives
had read and were influenced by the Gesta Francorum and its virulent anti-Byzantine tone, and
that they were therefore reflective of the attitudes of the Norman principality in Italy and not
western Europeans as a whole.285 Contemporary intertextuality is a much lesser concern
regarding sources discussing the Byzantines in the Second and Third Crusades, as the only
sources of note from these crusades which fit this description are the works of Odo of Deuil and
the anonymous author of the Historia de Expeditione. These authors did not have other
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contemporary sources investigating the same topics with which they could consult. However,
Odo himself admits that the French had developed suspicions about the Byzantines through
reading historical texts, which only could have been the hostile narrative histories from the
aftermath of the First Crusade.286 Though there is no such admission by the author of the
Historia de Expeditione, it is clear from the similarity in the stereotypes which he utilized that
the author was well versed in common narrative tropes regarding Byzantine treachery and
cowardice. Both Villehardouin and Robert de Clari wrote their accounts of the Fourth Crusade in
the immediate aftermath of the expedition, and thus were unaware of each other’s accounts.
However, like the authors of crusade histories before them, both Villehardouin and Clari utilized
stereotypes which were rampant throughout previous crusade texts.

Historiography
One might assume that these arguments fit soundly into the “clash of civilizations”287
theory, that these stereotypes were a representation of the incompatibility of Eastern and Western
civilizations, and that the Fourth Crusade was an epic, all-out war of civilizations. Modern
scholars have effectively deconstructed the most simplistic of these narratives. For example, this
model is based on the assumption that somehow the entirety of Western Christendom had one
opinion, one plan of action against the Byzantines, who themselves were also rigid and
completely unified in attitude. Different Western European nations, different leaders within the
crusader armies, and different factions within those armies all maintained diplomatic relations
with the Byzantine Emperor of varying warmth. Furthermore, the Byzantine emperors, as well as
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factions and influential leaders within the Empire were pro or anti-Western to varying degrees
throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Rather, the emphasis on stereotypes and hostile language fits well into the theory
proposed by Jonathan Harris in his work Byzantium and the Crusades. In this work, Harris
argued that the Byzantine imperial ideology and worldview, namely their belief in their right to a
universal empire and their rightful control over all their former lands, led to hostile encounters
between the Byzantines and crusaders. The Byzantine emperors, believing that it was correct to
manipulate and lie to the crusaders if it was in service of the Empire, incurred great hostility
from the western narrative authors.
Adding the Byzantine belief in the “Latin barbarian,” whose natural characteristics meant
that he could not be trusted and could be manipulated, and the western stereotype of the
effeminate Byzantine heretic, both of which are widely present in crusade-era primary sources,
only strengthens this theory. Hostile stereotypes against the Latins clearly influenced Byzantine
decision-makers, who instantly assumed that the crusading movement was intrinsically hostile to
the Empire and a ploy to steal their land. They accordingly acted to minimize the freedom of
movement and potential threat of the crusader armies, sowing mutual distrust. Meanwhile, the
crusaders, who thought that the Byzantines would welcome them with open arms and join them,
were extremely jaded after the First Crusade, and wrote their narrative accounts with this feeling
of distrust and betrayal. These feelings of betrayal, combined with prior long held stereotypes of
Greek treachery, led to evermore hostile encounters between the crusaders and Byzantines, who
resorted to threats of violence and open warfare to acquire the supplies and monetary support
they deemed fitting for such a rich Christian empire to provide.

Conclusion

105

Therefore, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that crusade-era authors
employed the use of hostile language and stereotypes frequently and thoroughly throughout their
texts. The crusade authors depicted the Byzantines as traitorous, cowardly heretics who were
hostile to the goals of the crusade. The Byzantine authors depicted the crusaders as greedy,
untrustworthy barbarians who were constantly aiming to destroy the Byzantine Empire. There is
direct evidence that contemporaries read these texts, and the authors were often high ranking and
important figures within the governments and decision-making bodies of the Byzantine Empire
and the crusade contingents. The prevalence of these stereotypes matches perfectly with
Jonathan Harris’ Fourth Crusade theory that the Byzantine diplomatic bureaucracy misjudged the
intentions of the crusaders. They misjudged them because of the Byzantine imperial ideology,
and the hostile stereotypes of barbarians was a crucial aspect of this ideology. Furthermore, the
crusaders possessed their own crusade ideology and worldview, within which the Byzantines
were enemies who opposed their progress repeatedly. The only way to resolve their opposition
was, as evidenced by Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI, with the use of military force. The
leaders of the Fourth Crusade adhered to this idea, and the results were devastating for the
Byzantines and the crusade movement.
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